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REPUDIATING DEATH 
WILLIAM W. BERRY III*
In recent years, three Supreme Court Justices, Powell, Blackmun, and 
Stevens, have all called for the abolition of the death penalty, repudiating 
their prior approval of the use of capital punishment.  This Article 
conceptualizes these reversals not as normative shifts on the morality of 
capital punishment, but instead as shifts in the Justices’ views concerning 
their own need to exercise judicial restraint towards the states with respect 
to the death penalty. 
 
Two separate decisions comprise their abandonment of judicial 
restraint.  First, Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens all acquiesce to 
the decision of the Court to use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the 
states’ administration of capital punishment.  Later, each of the three 
Justices separately advocates interpreting the Eighth Amendment to 
prohibit the states’ use of the death penalty entirely.  This Article argues 
that both of these decisions to abandon deference to the states reflect, on 
the part of Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens, a diminishing view of 
the Court’s duty to exercise judicial restraint with respect to state 
legislatures and their use of the death penalty. 
In addition to explaining why their respective rejections of the death 
penalty were institutional (and not moral) choices, this Article argues that 
these repudiations were the inevitable consequence of the initial decision to 
use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the death penalty.  The experience of 
these Justices and the Court over the past thirty-five years demonstrates the 
extreme difficulty in interpreting and applying the Eighth Amendment in a 
manner that ensures that states’ administration of the death penalty is fair 
and non-arbitrary.  When one premises his support of capital punishment 
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upon the notion that the application of the Eighth Amendment can achieve 
these goals, as Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens did, the futility of 
trying to correct the myriad of problems with the states’ use of the death 
penalty leads to the conclusion that no fruitful remedy exists other than 
abolishing capital punishment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“In order to learn, one must change one’s mind.” 
—Orson Scott Card 
It is a rare occurrence for a Supreme Court Justice to reverse his or her 
stance on a particular issue.  And yet, that is what has happened with three 
Justices’ views as to the use of capital punishment in the United States.  All 
three had voted to uphold capital punishment as constitutional under the 
Eighth Amendment beginning in the 1970s, and one by one, most recently 
in 2008, each concluded that capital punishment should be abolished after 
twenty years of deciding capital cases on the United States Supreme Court.1
First, there was the repudiation of the use of the death penalty by 
Justice Lewis Powell, who dissented in Furman v. Georgia,
 
2 voted with the 
three-Justice plurality in Gregg v. Georgia,3 and authored the majority 
opinion in McCleskey v. Kemp.4  During a conversation with his former law 
clerk John Jeffries in the summer of 1991, retired Justice Powell was asked 
whether he would change his vote in any prior case.5
“Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp.”
  Their conversation 
went as follows: 
6
 
1 As explained below, both Justices Blackmun and Powell initially rejected the 
application of the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment in 1972, and Justice Stevens 
voted to uphold the constitutionality of the death penalty in 1976.  Justice Powell rejected 
use of the death penalty in its entirety after his retirement in 1991, Justice Blackmun rejected 
it in 1994, and Justice Stevens rejected it in 2008. 
 
2 408 U.S. 238 (1972).  Furman held that the death penalty violated the Eighth 
Amendment because its application was so arbitrary as to constitute “cruel and unusual” 
punishment, temporarily abolishing its use in the United States.  See discussion infra Parts II 
and III. 
3 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  Gregg held that punishment of death for the crime of murder did 
not, under all circumstances, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, reinstating the 
use of the death penalty.  See discussion infra Parts II and III. 
4 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  McCleskey upheld the death penalty even though social science 
studies demonstrated racial bias in the administration of the death penalty, namely based on 
the race of the victim.  Id. at 313. 
5 This conversation was recorded for a biography of Justice Powell that Jeffries wrote.  
See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994).  
6 Ironically, McCleskey had only been decided four years prior (in 1987) to Justice 
Powell’s repudiation of capital punishment.  McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279. 
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“Do you mean you would now accept the argument from statistics?” 
“No, I would vote the other way in any capital case.” 
“In any capital case?” 
“Yes.” 
“Even in Furman v. Georgia?” 
“Yes.  I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished.”7
Justice Harry Blackmun followed in Justice Powell’s footsteps in 
1994, when he likewise concluded that the death penalty should be 
abolished.  Like Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun had been a dissenter in 
Furman
 
8 and concurred in Gregg.9
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.  For more 
than 20 years I have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—along with a majority of 
this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the 
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor.  Rather than continue to 
coddle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and 
the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply 
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed.  It is virtually self-evident to 
me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can 
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.  The basic 
question—does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendants 
“deserve” to die?—cannot be answered in the affirmative.
  Just weeks before he retired from the 
Supreme Court in 1994, Justice Blackmun dissented to the denial of 
certiorari in Callins v. Collins, and in doing so, wrote: 
10
As with Justices Powell and Blackmun, Justice John Paul Stevens 
reached the conclusion that the death penalty should be abolished.  Justice 
Stevens was not on the Court at the time of Furman, but joined with Justice 
Powell in the three-Justice plurality that wrote Gregg.
  
11  Nonetheless, in 
Baze v. Rees,12 decided in June 2008, Justice Stevens wrote the following in 
his concurrence: 
In sum, just as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in Furman 
 
7 See JEFFRIES, supra note 
on his 
extensive exposure to countless cases for which death is the authorized penalty, I have 
relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the 
death penalty represents “the pointless and needless extinction of life with only 
marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.”  A penalty with 
5, at 451. 
8 408 U.S. 238 (1972).   
9 Interestingly, both Justices Blackmun and Stevens dissented from Justice Powell’s 
opinion in McCleskey.  See discussions infra subparts III.A. and III.B. 
10 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145–46 (1994) (dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (citation omitted).  
11 See supra note 3.    
12 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008).  The Court in Baze held that the risk of improper 
administration of the first drug did not render the three-drug protocol cruel and unusual 
under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.  Id. 
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such negligible returns to the State [is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual 
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.13
It is clear that Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens believe that the 
Furman experiment—that is, the Court’s attempt, beginning in Gregg, to 
remedy the constitutional flaws of capital punishment—has failed.  But, 
there has been no systematic attempt to explore how and why each Justice 
reached the same conclusion and the degree to which these rationales relate 
to each other.  This Article attempts to fill that void in several ways. 
 
First, this Article conceptualizes these reversals not as normative shifts 
on the morality of capital punishment, but instead as shifts in the Justices’ 
views concerning judicial restraint towards the states with respect to the 
death penalty.14
Two separate decisions comprise the Justices’ abandonment of judicial 
restraint.  Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens first all acquiesce to the 
decision of the Court to use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the states’ 
administration of capital punishment.  Later, each of the three Justices 
separately advocates interpreting the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the 
states’ use of the death penalty entirely.  This Article argues that both of 
these decisions to abandon deference to the states reflect, on the part of 
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens, a diminishing view of the Court’s 
duty to exercise judicial restraint with respect to state legislatures and their 
use of the death penalty. 
 
In addition to explaining why their respective rejections of the death 
penalty were institutional (and not moral) choices, the Article argues that 
these repudiations were the inevitable consequence of the initial decision to 
use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the death penalty.  The experience of 
these Justices and the Court over the past thirty-five years demonstrates the 
extreme difficulty in interpreting and applying the Eighth Amendment in a 
manner that ensures that states’ administration of the death penalty is fair 
and non-arbitrary.  When one premises his support of capital punishment 
upon the notion that the application of the Eighth Amendment can achieve 
these goals, as Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens did, the futility of 
trying to correct the myriad of problems with the states’ use of the death 
penalty leads to the conclusion that no fruitful remedy exists other than 
abolishing capital punishment. 
 
13 Id. at 1551. 
14 See infra Part II.  As explained in Part II, “judicial restraint” refers to the role of the 
Court in interpreting the constitution and the degree to which it defers to state legislative 
action.  Here, in the capital context, the three Justices slowly abandoned their initial 
deferential approaches, finding the Constitution to apply to, regulate, and ultimately forbid 
the use of capital punishment. 
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Part II of the Article outlines the Court’s doctrines of judicial restraint 
and frames the two separate decisions to abandon judicial restraint in the 
context of the Eighth Amendment.  Part III traces the two shifts in each 
Justice’s conception of judicial restraint: (1) the shift from a view of 
complete deference to the states’ use of the death penalty to one of 
regulating its use, and (2) the shift from regulating the states’ use of the 
death penalty to a view that the Court should abolish the use of the death 
penalty by the states altogether.  Finally, Part IV explains why the 
conclusion that the death penalty should be abolished was an inevitable 
consequence of the Justices’ initial decision to constitutionalize the death 
penalty. 
II.  JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN CAPITAL CASES 
“For nowadays, restraint gets you friends, honesty gets you hated.” 
—Terence 
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
Since Marbury v. Madison15 established that the Supreme Court had 
the primary responsibility of interpreting the Constitution, the Court has 
grappled with the concept of judicial restraint.16
 
15 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).  The scholarship on the role of the Supreme Court with 
respect to state legislatures is an extensive body of literature, as is the scholarship addressing 
the various competing methods of constitutional interpretation.  See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington 
& Roger C. Crampton, Judicial Independence In Excess: Reviving The Judicial Duty Of The 
Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009); Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional 
Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REV. 828 (1999); Benjamin C. Mizer, The Bureaucratic Court, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 1301 (2006); see also Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional 
Interpretation and the Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 
29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 127 (2004); David A.J. Richards, Originalism Without 
Foundations, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373 (1990); Willard C. Shih, Assisted Suicide, the Due 
Process Clause and “Fidelity In Translation,” 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245 (1995). 
  The Court has been 
16 For purposes of this Article, the concept of “judicial restraint” is limited to the ways in 
which Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens refer to it in the Eighth Amendment context.  
See discussion infra in Part III.  It is worth noting that the use of the phrases “judicial 
activism” and “judicial restraint,” have been used in a variety of different ways.  Indeed, 
judicial restraint has been characterized as a “contestable concept open to a variety of 
definitions.”  Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the Promotion of Judicial 
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT 271, 274 (2005); see also Matthew J. Franck, Depends on 
What the Meaning of Judicial Activism Is, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Sept. 13, 2006), 
http://nationalreview.com/search/ (search for “Matthew Franck” under date 9/13/06) 
(arguing that activism can be pretty neutrally defined as the wrongful use of power we call 
judicial review).  Some have tried to resuscitate these terms by defining their various 
meanings, see Keenan Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of Judicial Activism, 92 
CALIF. L. REV. 1441 (2004) (describing the various derogatory connotations of “judicial 
activism,” all of which involve judges improperly usurping power properly belonging to 
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hesitant, in theory, to interpret the Constitution in such a way as to 
substitute its own judgment for that of the state legislatures or the Congress, 
particularly when applying open-ended and ambiguous constitutional 
language.17  In its cases, the Court has articulated several canons of 
interpretation that counsel against both constitutionalizing an issue in the 
first place and against deciding constitutional questions unless it is 
absolutely necessary to do so.18
Thus, despite the presence of the Supremacy Clause and the holding of 
Marbury, the Supreme Court has placed value on the concept of judicial 
restraint in its application of the Constitution to state and federal statutes.
 
19
While I completely subscribe to the holding of Marbury v. Madison and subsequent 
cases, that our Court has constitutional power to strike down statutes, state or federal, 
that violate commands of the Federal Constitution, I do not believe that we are 
granted power by the Due Process Clause or any other constitutional provision or 
provisions to measure constitutionality by our belief that legislation is arbitrary, 
capricious or unreasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable purpose, or is offensive to 
our own notions of “civilized standards of conduct.”
  
Justice Black perhaps best summarized this sentiment in his Griswold v. 
Connecticut dissent: 
20
In other words, at least for purposes of this Article, judicial restraint 
means interpreting the Constitution in such a way so as not to prohibit the 





other democratic entities, and trying to propose a series of different types of “activism” to 
give the term meaning), or trying to distinguish between various types of activism, see 
Caprice Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 
TENN. L. REV. 567 (2007); see also Lori A. Ringhand, The Rehnquist Court: A “By The 
Numbers” Retrospective, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1033 (2007) (using a statistical analysis to 
argue that the Rehnquist Court was more activist than its predecessors). 
  Accordingly, this Article considers judicial 
17 In practice, of course, the Court often applies the Constitution in such a way as to 
usurp power from the states or the Congress in the name of applying the Constitution, but its 
opinions nonetheless often discuss the value of the Court exercising restraint. 
18 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., 
concurring). 
19 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
20 381 U.S. 479, 513 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
21 Judicial restraint as it is used here can encompass (but does not have to) various 
methods constitutional interpretation, including interpreting the constitution with fidelity to 
the “original” meaning of the Constitution (“originalism”), with fidelity to the “plain” 
meaning of the text of the Constitution (“textualism”), and interpreting the Constitution 
consistent with prior interpretations by the Court (“stare decisis”).  See, e.g., Andrew M. 
Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death of Necessity and the Transformation of 
the Supreme Court’s Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119, 1178 n.320 (1995); 
Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 52 
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restraint in the manner that Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens do in the capital 
context—only with reference to either the decision to use the Constitution 
to regulate the exercise of power by state legislatures or the decision to 
prohibit such an exercise altogether.22
Further, the concept of judicial restraint requires the Justices to put 
aside their own political views when assessing the constitutionality of a 
state statute.  The concern, of course, is that Justices will use various 
constitutional interpretive methods as a pretext for overriding the will of the 
majority, as expressed through the state legislatures, where the Justice has a 




B. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT:  
AN OVERVIEW 
 
In the Eighth Amendment context, the concept of judicial restraint as 
herein construed refers to two thresholds.  The first is the decision to 
constitutionalize the death penalty in the first place, and make its use by the 
states subject to constitutional restrictions (as interpreted by the Court).  In 
other words, the first opportunity for the Justices to restrain themselves is to 
avoid applying the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment at all, and 
allow state legislatures alone to regulate its use (and choose to allow or 
disallow it) entirely.24
 
(2001) (noting that “if one believes in the determinacy of the underlying legal texts” then 
judicial restraint may mean “fidelity to the texts themselves”). 
 
22 Thus, this Article does not consider the use of judicial restraint in the context of the 
Court’s restrictions on Congressional or federal executive power. 
23 There is no dearth of modern constitutional law scholarship that attempts to address 
the countermajoritarian difficulty, that is, to explain why, notwithstanding our commitment 
to rule by the people, it is permissible for judges to be innovators in matters of social policy.  
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE BAR ON POLITICS 17–20 (Yale University Press 1986) (1962); JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (seeking to explain how the innovations of the Warren 
Court were consistent with a basic commitment to democracy).  For an historical 
perspective, see Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
One: The Road To Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998); Barry Friedman, The 
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part II: Reconstruction’s Political Court, 91 
GEO. L.J. 1 (2002); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part 
Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001); Barry Friedman, The History 
of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971 
(2000); Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L. J. 153 (2002). 
24 Indeed, prior to Furman v. Georgia, this had been the Court’s practice for almost two 
hundred years, as it had never considered the constitutionality of the death penalty under the 
Eighth Amendment. 
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Once this first threshold of restraint is crossed and the Court decides to 
apply the Eighth Amendment to capital punishment, the Court is in the 
position of regulating its use under the Eighth Amendment, applying the 
open-ended concept of “cruel and unusual punishment” to determine which 
capital practices are permissible and which are unconstitutional.25
The second threshold is the decision to prohibit the use of the death 
penalty altogether.  The exercise of restraint here would be to allow the 
states to continue to modify their capital punishment schemes and statutes 
to comply with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment.
 
26
While there are varying levels of restraint in between these two 
thresholds, the concept of judicial restraint here refers primarily to the 
decision to cross each of these thresholds.  This Article thus is 
conceptualizing the parallel decisions of Justices Powell, Blackmun, and 
Stevens to cross these two thresholds and abandon their prior positions of 
restraint as to each one. 
  The decision 
to cross the second threshold means deciding that the states no longer can 
use the death penalty. 
As explained in more detail below, the use of the concept of judicial 
restraint by Justices Powell and Blackmun, and later Justice Stevens, as a 
reason for not crossing each of these thresholds serves as the source of this 
conceptualization.  Indeed, the Justices (at least Powell and Blackmun)27 
initially believed that the Court should not cross the first threshold, that is, 
apply the Constitution to the death penalty at all.28  Over time, however, 
each of the three Justices has advocated crossing not only the first, but also 
the second threshold by holding that the Constitution bars the use of the 
death penalty entirely.29
 
25 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 
26 Interestingly, many believed at the time that it was decided that Furman v. Georgia 
crossed both thresholds in its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, but the Court proved 
otherwise in Gregg v. Georgia four years later.  See Corinna Barrett Lain, Furman 
Fundamentals, 82 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2007).  
27 Justice Stevens was not yet on the Court at that time.  Based on his initial decisions 
when he first was appointed to the Court, however, one can infer that he would have held 
similar initial views to those of Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell.  See infra subpart 
III.C. 
28 See infra Part III. 
29 Id. 
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III. THE ABANDONMENT OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
“
—Confucius 
When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them.” 
Before exploring the evolving positions of each of the three Justices on 
matters related to capital punishment, it is important to note that none of the 
three has ever based their holdings in capital cases on normative (moral or 
philosophical) grounds.  Unlike Justices Brennan and Marshall on the left, 
or Justices Rehnquist and Burger on the right, these three Justices have 
sought to apply the constitutionality of capital punishment not on 
ideological grounds but instead on pragmatic ones.30  Indeed, the question 
for them is not whether capital punishment ought to be applied in the 
philosophical sense, but instead whether it can be applied even-handedly 
and if so, how the criminal justice system should be structured, including 
adding necessary safeguards, to insure that the process is equitable.31
From the ratification of the Constitution in 1791 until the 1960s, the 
constitutionality of capital punishment in the United States was never 
addressed by the Supreme Court.
  As 
we will see, it is in part the absence of a broader ideological, normative 
commitment to the death penalty on the part of Justices Powell, Blackmun, 
and Stevens that ultimately provides the freedom to change their respective 
views. 
32  This is unsurprising as the use of capital 
punishment was widespread in the United States in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries.33
 
30 See discussion, infra, subparts III.A, III.B, and III.C. 
  Further, the plain language of the Constitution 
seemed to presume that capital punishment would be used.  The Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: 
31 I have argued elsewhere that the perception of the equity and fairness of capital 
procedures plays a significant role in the degree to which the death penalty is actually 
utilized in the United States.  See William W. Berry III, American Procedural 
Exceptionalism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 481 (2008). 
32 See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of ‘Unusual’: The Eighth Amendment 
as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739 (2008); see also Anthony F. 
Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 
CALIF. L. REV. 839, 840 (1969) (arguing “cruel and unusual” was a kind of “constitutional 
‘boilerplate’”). 
33 See J. Caleb Rackley, Legal Ethics in Capital Cases: Looking for Virtue in Roberts v. 
Dretke and Assessing the Ethical Implications of the Death Row Volunteer, 36 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 1119 (2005); Joanna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays and the 
Deterrence of Capital Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (2004); Franklin E. Zimring, The 
Unexamined Death Penalty: Capital Punishment and Reform of the Model Penal Code, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1396 (2005). 
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No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime. . . nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb. . . nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . .34
Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment, in adopting the due process 
language of the Fifth Amendment, provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
 
35
These constitutional provisions plainly allow for the possibility that 
federal and state governments may choose to use capital punishment; some 
crimes will be “capital” and the government, whether state or federal, may 
deprive its citizens of life after according them the requisite due process of 
law.  It does not address the degree to which the Constitution may be used, 
if at all, to regulate the use of capital punishment, but instead merely 
implies the potential availability of the death penalty. 
 
In the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia, the United States Supreme 
Court held five to four that the death penalty, as applied by the various 
states, constituted “cruel and unusual” punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.36  As discussed below, Justices Powell and Blackmun both 
dissented from the majority opinion largely on grounds of judicial 
restraint—that is, neither believed that the problems identified with the 
capital system in Georgia were significant enough to permit the Justices to 
interpret the Constitution to prohibit the death penalty.37  Justice Powell 
found that the references to capital punishment in the text of the 
Constitution,38 the intent of the Framers, and the precedents of the Court all 
cautioned against interpreting the Eighth Amendment in a way that 
precluded the use of the death penalty.39  Justice Blackmun cited these same 
reasons as the basis for exercising judicial restraint (and preserving the role 
of state legislatures) in deciding how and when to use the death penalty.40  
He underscored the importance of such restraint with his own admission 
that if he were a legislator, he would vote against capital punishment.41
When the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. 
Georgia, Justice Stevens joined Justices Powell and Stewart as the 
 
 
34 U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
35 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added). 
36 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
37 Id. at 464 (Powell, J., dissenting).  As mentioned above, Justice Stevens was not yet a 
member of the Supreme Court. 
38 Id. at 417–20. 
39 Id. at 431. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 406 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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triumvirate that wrote the controlling plurality opinion.42
Of course, the requirements of the Eighth Amendment must be applied with an 
awareness of the limited role to be played by the courts.  This does not mean that 
judges have no role to play, for the Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise 
of legislative power . . . .  But, while we have an obligation to insure that 
constitutional bounds are not overreached, we may not act as judges as we might as 
legislators . . . .  Courts are not representative bodies.  They are not designed to be a 
good reflex of a democratic society.  Their judgment is best informed, and therefore 
most dependable, within narrow limits.  Their essential quality is detachment, founded 
on independence.  History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is 
jeopardized when courts become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume 
primary responsibility in choosing between competing political, economic and social 
pressures.
  Their language in 
Gregg made clear that the principle of judicial restraint remained a 
significant consideration in the application of the Eighth Amendment to 
state statutes: 
43
Justices Stevens, Powell, and Stewart concluded that “in assessing a 
punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the 
constitutional measure, we presume its validity . . . .  [A] heavy burden rests 
on those who would attack the judgment of the representatives of the 
people.”
 
44  Thus, in the context of capital punishment, the Court in Gregg 
concluded that its role in applying the Eighth Amendment was one of 
deference to the state legislatures, with certain limitations.45
The Court’s role, then, in applying the Eighth Amendment was one of 
restraint, in which states could remedy their constitutional defects and 
legislative actions, and for the most part be respected.  How then did 
Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens all conclude that the Court should 
relinquish this position and ban capital punishment?  As the cases 
demonstrate, each Justice’s fidelity to the concept of judicial restraint began 
to wane over time as their confidence in the ability of the states to carry out 
capital trials in a fair and non-arbitrary way began to dissipate. 
 
 
42 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  Justice Blackmun adhered to his Furman 
position that the Court should not interfere with the ability of states to use the death penalty, 
and thus concurred in the decision of the Court in Gregg.  Id. 
43 Id. at 174–75. 
44 Id. at 175. 
45 These of course included the provision of safeguards such as aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, proportionality review by state supreme courts, bifurcated trials, 
and a prohibition against the use of the mandatory death penalty.  See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
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A. JUSTICE POWELL 
1. Deferring to Death 
Unlike some of his colleagues,46 Justice Lewis Powell did not seek to 
advance a normative position in favor of or against the death penalty.47  
Indeed, in his career before becoming a Justice, Powell felt that “the low 
numbers of people even sentenced to death were proof that [capital 
punishment] was not an issue of ‘first importance.’”48  When faced with the 
issue in McGautha and Furman, Justice Powell approached the 
constitutionality of capital punishment as a pragmatist who prided himself 
on judicial restraint, particularly in encroaching on the powers conferred 
upon state and federal legislatures.49  As one of the four dissenters in 
Furman, Justice Powell found no basis for finding the death penalty 
unconstitutional.50  Writing separately, Justice Powell emphasized that 
“whatever punishments the Framers of the Constitution may have intended 
to prohibit under the ‘cruel and unusual’ language, there cannot be the 
slightest doubt that they intended no absolute bar on the Government’s 
authority to impose the death penalty.”51  Specifically, Justice Powell wrote 
that “the Court is not free to read into the Constitution a meaning that is 
plainly at variance with its language.  Both the language of the Fifth and 
 
46 Indeed, Jeffries writes, “On Powell’s first day on the Court, [Justice] Marshall joked, 
‘Do you have your capital punishment opinion written yet?’”  JEFFRIES, supra note 
Fourteenth Amendments and the history of the Eighth Amendment confirm 
beyond doubt that the death penalty was considered to be a constitutionally 
5, at 408; 
see also BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME 
COURT 205 (1979) (reporting the same exchange). 
47 As previously stated, Justice Powell reserved his decision on capital punishment to the 
Constitution and restraint to state legislators, 
Not only had [Justice Powell] not written an opinion; he actually did not have one.  He had never 
been involved in a capital case and had never really thought about the issue . . . [i]n truth, Powell 
was neither enthusiastically for nor categorically against capital punishment.  He instinctively 
recoiled from extreme positions, particularly those nonnegotiable ideological commitments that 
left not room for compromise or debate.  This was especially true of capital punishment . . . . 
Powell not only rejected the extremes on either side; he shied away from the debate they 
dominated.  Spared by experience from the necessity of coming to grips with capital punishment 
and temperamentally disinclined to enter a question so rife with rage and conflict, Powell came 
to the Court without a fixed view. 
JEFFRIES, supra note 5, at 408–09. 
48 Id. 
49 Id.; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); McGautha v. California, 402 
U.S. 183 (1971). 
50 Id. 
51 Furman, 408 U.S.at 419 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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permissible punishment.”52  Further, given the principle of stare decisis, 
Justice Powell opposed the abolition of the death penalty in Furman 
because “those who today would have this Court undertake the absolute 
abolition of the death penalty also must reject the opinions of other cases 
stipulating or assuming the constitutionality of capital punishment.”53
While Justice Powell was certainly not oblivious to the concerns of the 
majority relating to the use of the death penalty in Furman, he nonetheless 
believed that such concerns did not warrant abolition.
 
54  He explained that 
“[w]hile there might be specific cases in which capital punishment would 
be regarded as excessive and shocking to the conscience of the community, 
it can hardly be argued that the public’s dissatisfaction with the penalty in 
particular cases would translate into a demand for absolute abolition.”55  
Even though “this criminal sanction [the death penalty] falls more heavily 
on the relatively impoverished and underprivileged elements of society,” 
Justice Powell rationalized that “[t]he ‘have-nots’ in every society always 
have been subject to greater pressure to commit crimes and to fewer 
constraints than their more affluent fellow citizens.”56  For Justice Powell, 
“[t]his is, indeed, a tragic byproduct of social and economic deprivation, but 
it is not an argument of constitutional proportions under the Eighth or 
Fourteenth Amendment.”57  And, “[t]he same discriminatory impact 
argument could be made with equal force and logic with respect to those 
sentenced to prison terms.”58
In particular, Justice Powell emphasized the importance of restraint on 
issues such as substantive due process and capital punishment to state 
legislatures.  He then chastised the majority’s decision for overreaching in 
its use of authority.  He wrote that the majority’s ruling was “the very sort 
of judgment that the legislative branch is competent to make and for which 




52 Id. at 420.  
  Justice Powell concluded, “the indicators 
most likely to reflect the public’s view—legislative bodies, state referenda, 
and the juries which have the actual responsibility—do not support the 
contention that evolving standards of decency require total abolition of 
53 Id. at 424. 
54 Id.  Indeed, he recognized the problems identified by the majority, but did not find 
those to be significant enough to warrant “constitutional” intervention by the Court.  Id. 
55 Id. at 445. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 447. 
59 Id. at 418. 
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capital punishment . . . .” and that “[t]he assessment of popular opinion is 
essentially a legislative, not a judicial function.”60
This second threshold to cross (in abolition via the Constitution) is 
important precisely because of its apparent permanency (notwithstanding 
the Court reversing itself).  In other words, once the Court decides that the 
Constitution bars certain action by state legislatures, there is no opportunity 
for the state legislatures to cure any constitutional defects of such an action 
without the Court reversing or modifying its application of the Constitution.  
Justice Powell clearly grasped this, as he explained in his Furman dissent: 
 
It is important to keep in focus the enormity of the step undertaken by the Court 
today.  Not only does it invalidate hundreds of state and federal laws, it deprives those 
jurisdictions of the power to legislate with respect to capital punishment in the future, 
except in the manner consistent with the cloudily outlined views of those Justices who 
do not purport to undertake total abolition . . . . 
It seems to me that the sweeping judicial action undertaken today reflects a basic lack 
of faith and confidence in the democratic process.  Many may regret, as I do, the 
failure of some legislative bodies to address the capital punishment issue with greater 
frankness or effectiveness.  Many might decry their failure either to abolish the 
penalty entirely or selectively, or to establish standards for its enforcement.  But 
impatience with the slowness, or even unresponsiveness, of legislatures is no 
justification for judicial intrusion upon their historic powers.61
In Gregg and its companion cases decided the same day, Justice 
Powell was part of the three-Justice plurality (with Justices Stevens and 
Stewart) that wrote the controlling opinions in the cases.
 
62  As described 
above, the plurality reinstated the death penalty under the Eighth 
Amendment in Gregg, finding that while the Court could place restrictions 
on the use of capital punishment, the revised Georgia scheme provided 
enough safeguards to cure its prior constitutional defects.63  Similarly, in 
Proffitt v. Florida, a Powell plurality upheld the Florida capital system on 
similar grounds to Gregg.64
 
60 Id. at 442–43. 
  After the Florida legislature’s adoption of the 
61 Id. at 461–65. 
62 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); 
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).  These cases were decided a mere four years after 
Furman v. Georgia. 
63 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198. 
64 Proffitt, 428 U.S. 242.  As the Court explained, the basic difference between the 
Florida system and the Georgia system was that, in Florida, the sentence was determined by 
the trial judge rather than by the jury, which did not create a constitutional problem.  Id. at 
252.  It continued: “it would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything, to even 
greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level of capital punishment, since a 
trial judge is more experienced in sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to 
impose sentences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.”  Id. 
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new capital scheme, the Court indicated that it was constitutional because it 
was no longer true that there was “no meaningful basis for distinguishing 
the few cases in which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases 
in which it is not.”65  Likewise, in Jurek v. Texas, the Court upheld the 
Texas capital scheme because it provided, at least in theory, a way to 
narrow the class of murderers for whom the death penalty is available.66
Justice Powell’s decisions in Gregg and its companion cases were an 
abandonment of his Furman position insofar as he agreed to go along with 
the Court’s decision to constitutionalize capital punishment.
 
67
Equally important, these cases defined when the Court should 
intervene and the basis for it doing so.  As explained by Justices Stewart, 
Stevens, and Powell in Woodson v. North Carolina,
  This shift in 
Justice Powell, crossing the threshold that the Supreme Court could now 
regulate capital punishment, is evident from his votes in these cases as part 
of the three-Justice plurality that wrote the controlling opinions. 
68 “[t]he Eighth 
Amendment stands to assure that the State’s power to punish is ‘exercised 
within the limits of civilized standards.’”69  As a result, “[c]entral to the 
application of the Eighth Amendment is a determination of contemporary 
standards regarding the infliction of punishment . . . .”70  Further, “[t]he two 
crucial indicators of evolving standards of decency respecting the 
imposition of punishment in our society. . . [are] jury determinations and 
legislative enactments . . . .”71
In other words, the initial justification for crossing the first threshold 
of judicial restraint, and thereby ending the complete autonomy of the state 
 
 
65 Id. at 254. 
66 Jurek, 428 U.S. 268–71.  To obtain a death sentence in Texas, the State is required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “there is a probability that the defendant would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”  Id. at 
269. 
67 By contrast, Justice Blackmun remained firm to his Furman view that the Court ought 
not to use the Eighth Amendment to regulate the states’ administration of the death penalty.  
Id. at 279 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  See discussion infra, subpart III.B. 
68 428 U.S. 280 (1976).  In Woodson, the plurality of Justices Powell, Stevens, and 
Stewart voted to strike down the legislative scheme in North Carolina that provided for a 
mandatory death sentence for murder. 
69 Id. at 288 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). 
70 Id. at 280.  The concept of “evolving standards of decency” came from Trop, a non-
capital case where the Court held that a penalty of loss of citizenship for desertion was 
unconstitutional—a “cruel and unusual” punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  
Trop, 356 U.S. at 103.  For a discussion of the inherent weaknesses with the “evolving 
standards of decency” doctrine, see William W. Berry III, Following the Yellow Brick Road 
of Evolving Standards of Decency: The Ironic Consequences of “Death is Different” 
Jurisprudence, 28 PACE L. REV. 15 (2007). 
71 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293. 
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legislatures, was the availability of proxies for public opinion.72
Thus, Justice Powell crossed the threshold of constitutionalizing 
capital punishment, but did so where the assessment of state statutes rested 
on the consensus among state legislatures and juries.  The Court tempered 
the judicial restraint lost by declaring one state’s capital statutory scheme 
unconstitutional by the imputation of the practices of a majority of other 
states.
  As a result, 
it was acceptable to abandon judicial restraint and regulate the use of capital 
punishment if the primary reason for regulation was majoritarian opinion 
vis-à-vis the juries or the legislatures themselves. 
73  The Court then was not substituting its political judgment for that 
of the states; rather, it was using the Constitution, via the evolving 
standards of decency, to eliminate “outliers.”74
In Woodson, the Court relied on the practices of other states to justify 
its declaration that the mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional.
 
75
legislative measures adopted by the people’s chosen representatives weigh heavily in 
ascertaining contemporary standards of decency.  The consistent course charted by the 
state legislatures and by Congress since the middle of the past century demonstrates 
that the aversion of jurors to mandatory death penalty statutes is shared by society at 
large.




72 Interestingly, the Court began to slide away from this one year later in Coker v. 
Georgia, when it emphasized that the Court’s “own judgment will be brought to bear on the 
question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.”  433 U.S. 
584, 598 (1977). 
 
73 See Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren 
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004). 
74 Ultimately, this leads to a practice of counting states to determine what the 
contemporary standard of decency is.  See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 
(holding executions of people under the age of eighteen at the time the crime is committed is 
“cruel and unusual” punishment under the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
304 (2002) (holding executions of mentally retarded people constitute “cruel and unusual” 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment).  This approach has been harshly criticized by 
others on the Court.  See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 337–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s 
decision is the pinnacle of our Eighth Amendment death-is-different jurisprudence.  Not only 
does it, like all of that jurisprudence, find no support in the text or history of the Eighth 
Amendment; it does not even have support in current social attitudes regarding the 
conditions that render an otherwise just death penalty inappropriate.  Seldom has an opinion 
of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.”) 
75 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 298.  Part of this inquiry also includes surveying the historical 
practices in assessing “contemporary standards.”  In Woodson, for instance, the Court 
explained that “[t]he history of mandatory death penalty statutes in the United States thus 
reveals that the practice of sentencing to death all persons convicted of a particular offense 
has been rejected as unduly harsh and unworkably rigid.”  Id. at 292–93. 
76 Id. at 294–95.  Similarly, the Court held that Louisiana’s mandatory death penalty 
statute was unconstitutional.  Roberts v. Louisana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
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Finally, it is worth noting that the Powell plurality also adopted 
additional guiding principles as to the constitutionality of state capital 
statutes under the Eighth Amendment.77  The Court established these limits 
not from any objective study of state legislatures, but instead from its own 
subjective determinations.78
First, the Court found the mandatory death penalty statute 
unconstitutional because it was likely to encourage juries to act lawlessly.
 
79  
As a result, “it does not fulfill Furman’s basic requirement by replacing 
arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with objective standards to guide, 
regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a 
sentence of death.”80
Second, and more importantly, Woodson articulated the requirement 
that the particularized aspects of a defendant’s case be considered at 
sentencing such that an individualized determination is made.
 
81  Statutory 
schemes thus must allow the consideration of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the individual defendant.82
2. Regulating Death 
 
The Court embarked on the process of regulating the use of the death 
penalty among the various states by using evolving standards of decency 
and the contemporary state legislative trend, combined with its own 
judgment.  In such cases, Justice Powell voted on several occasions to 
restrict certain state practices, but all within the broader shadow of the 
consensus of the other states.83
 
77 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293. 
  Even on such occasions, however, he was 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 303. 
81 Id. 
82 This principle was extended to prevent states from limiting the mitigating evidence 
that a defendant could put on at sentencing.  See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) 
(striking down Ohio’s statute for failure to allow defendant unfettered ability to put on 
mitigating evidence as required by Woodson’s holding that each defendant is entitled to an 
individualized determination).  
83 This is not surprising as Justice Powell was known for being hesitant about the Court 
usurping power on social issues.  As explained by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson: 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the Powellian approach, however, is its emphasis on the 
judicial role in facilitating the development of consensus over potentially divisive social issues.  
Our history is, unfortunately, replete with judicial attempts to preempt social conflict through 
constitutional decree—attempts that have all too often aggravated such conflict rather than 
ameliorated it.  The Powell approach sought to ensure that the most volatile issues in our society 
did not quickly achieve definitive outcomes in the courts.  He wished both to leave open the 
channels of judicial debate and to ensure that the “losers” in court (if they so recognized 
themselves) took not to the streets but rather to the voting booths and to the legislatures. 
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hesitant to restrict, any more than necessary, the states’ legislative freedom 
in establishing their capital systems.84
In Coker v. Georgia, for instance, while agreeing that the death penalty 
was a disproportionate punishment for the rape committed in the instant 
case, Justice Powell concurred to express his view that the Court should not 
foreclose the death penalty for rape in all cases.
 
85  Citing the majority 
opinion as one that “ranges well beyond what is necessary” and noting that 
aggravated rape was not before the Court, Justice Powell argued that it was 
“therefore quite unnecessary for the plurality to write in terms so sweeping 
as to foreclose each of the 50 state legislatures from creating a narrowly 
defined substantive crime of aggravated rape punishable by death.”86
[f]inal resolution of the question [of whether the death penalty was a disproportionate 
punishment for aggravated rape] must await careful inquiry into objective indicators 
of society’s “evolving standards of decency,” particularly legislative enactments and 
the responses of juries in capital cases.
  
Justice Powell thus believed that: 
87
While acknowledging that the plurality did engage in such an analysis 
(finding that almost every state had abolished the death penalty for rape), 
Justice Powell demonstrated his belief in restraint by emphasizing that 
 
it has not been shown that society finds the penalty disproportionate for all rapes.  In a 
proper case a more discriminating inquiry than the plurality undertakes well might 
discover that both juries and legislatures have reserved the ultimate penalty for the 
case of an outrageous rape resulting in serious, lasting harm to the victim.  I would not 
prejudge the issue.88
While Justice Powell generally agreed with the Court’s application of 
the evolving standards in cases after Coker, he gave no indication that he 
would ultimately cross the second threshold described above.  If anything, 
the cases toward the end of his tenure would have cautioned against any 
prediction that he would advocate the abolition of the death penalty by the 
Court and abandon entirely restraint and deference to state legislatures.  No 
 
 
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Powellian Virtues in a Polarized Era, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
271, 273 (1992).  
84 See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) (holding that the introduction of 
victim impact statement at sentencing phase of capital murder trial violated the Eighth 
Amendment, and Maryland statute was invalid to the extent it permitted consideration of that 
information); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that a sentence of death for 
the crime of rape of an adult women was disproportionate to the crime and thus in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment). 
85 Coker, 433 U.S. 584, 601–04 (Powell, J., concurring). 
86 Id. at 601–02. 
87 Id. at 603. 
88 Id. at 604. 
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case, perhaps, better illustrates his commitment to maintain some level of 
restraint to state legislatures in capital cases than McCleskey v. Kemp.89
In McCleskey, the issue before the Court was whether “a complex 
statistical study that indicate[d] a risk that racial considerations enter into 
capital sentencing determinations prove[d] that petitioner McCleskey’s 
capital sentence [was] unconstitutional under the Eighth or Fourteenth 
Amendment.”
 
90  Justice Powell wrote the opinion for a five-to-four majority 
that upheld McCleskey’s death sentence despite the overwhelming evidence 
of racial bias in capital cases found in David Baldus’s study.91
Justice Powell’s decision can be explained on the basis that there was a 
lack of evidence that McCleskey personally had been the victim of racial 
discrimination.
 
92  Equally important was the possibility that a Court remedy 
would enable litigation seeking widespread remedy to such systemic 
discrimination (and not necessarily just in capital cases).93
More broadly, however, Justice Powell’s decision fits with his larger 
concern for restraint and deference to the state legislatures.  First, he 
pointed out that 
 
[t]here was no evidence then, and there is none now, that the Georgia Legislature 
enacted the capital punishment statute to further a racially discriminatory purpose.  
Nor has McCleskey demonstrated that the legislature maintains the capital punishment 
statute because of the racially disproportionate impact suggested by the Baldus study.  
As legislatures necessarily have wide discretion in the choice of criminal laws and 
penalties, and as there were legitimate reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt 
and maintain capital punishment, we will not infer a discriminatory purpose on the 
part of the State of Georgia.94
 
89 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 
90 Id. at 282–83. 
91 Id.  Interestingly, the bias was based most significantly on the race of the victim.  Id. at 
292.  Defendants who killed white victims were more likely to receive the death penalty than 
those who killed African-American victims.  Id. at 293.  The Baldus study was a statistical 
study that purported to show a disparity in the imposition of death sentences in Georgia 
based on the murder victim’s race and, to a lesser extent, the defendant’s race.  Id.  The study 
was based on over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s, and 
involved data relating to the victim’s race, the defendant’s race, and the various 
combinations of such persons’ races.  Id.  The study indicated that black defendants who 
killed white victims had the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty.  Id. 
92 Justice Powell stressed that “the Baldus study is clearly insufficient to support an 
inference that any of the decisionmakers in McCleskey’s case acted with discriminatory 
purpose.”  Id. at 297; see Katherine Barnes, David Sloss, & Stephen Thaman, Place Matters 
(Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in Death Eligible Cases, 51 
ARIZ. L. REV. 305 (2009); Justin D. Levinson, Race, Death, and the Complicious Mind, 58 
DEPAUL L. REV. 599 (2009). 
93 Justice Powell wrote, “As these examples illustrate, there is no limiting principle to the 
type of challenge brought by McCleskey.”  McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 318. 
94 Id. at 298–99 (citations omitted). 
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In addition, because Georgia’s legislature established a capital system that 
complied with the constitutional requirements articulated in Furman,95 
Justice Powell argued that the presence of racial bias in jury decisions was 
not an adequate ground for declaring the capital system unconstitutional.96
Justice Powell also addressed the issue of jury discretion, citing 
Woodson and highlighting the need to defer to the states on such matters in 
allowing the exercise of discretion.
 
97  He explained that while “the power to 
be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate,”98 requiring “a capital 
punishment system that did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency 
‘would be totally alien to our notions of criminal justice.’”99
The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity 
that correlates with a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice 
system that includes capital punishment.  As we have stated specifically in the context 
of capital punishment, the Constitution does not “plac[e] totally unrealistic conditions 
on its use.”
  Indeed, wrote 
Justice Powell, 
100
Beyond expressing his belief that the Court ought to defer to state 
legislatures on such issues, Justice Powell went further, arguing, in fact, that 
the state legislature, as opposed to the Court, ought to address such issues in 
the first instance.  He wrote: 
 
McCleskey’s arguments are best presented to the legislative bodies.  It is not the 
responsibility—or indeed even the right—of this Court to determine the appropriate 
punishment for particular crimes . . . .  Legislatures also are better qualified to weigh 
and “evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions 




96 Id. at 308 (“Because McCleskey’s sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing 
procedures that focus discretion ‘on the particularized nature of the crime and the 
particularized characteristics of the individual defendant,’ we lawfully may presume that 
McCleskey’s death sentence was not ‘wantonly and freakishly’ imposed, and thus that the 
sentence is not disproportionate within any recognized meaning under the Eighth 
Amendment.”) (internal citations omitted). 
97 Id. at 312.  This is in stark contrast to the federal sentencing guidelines put in place 
just three years prior, which sought to minimize discretion in sentencing.  See, e.g., William 
W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to § 3553 After 
Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631 (2008) (describing the adoption of the 
sentencing guidelines). 
98 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312 (quoting KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: 
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 170 (1969)).  
99 Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 n.50 (1976)). 
100 Id. at 319 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199 n.50). 
101 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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3. Repudiating Death 
As described above, Justice Powell never crossed the second 
threshold—repudiation of the death penalty—during his time on the Court.  
After his retirement in 1991, however, Justice Powell continued to work on 
issues related to the administration of justice in the United States.  His work 
on several committees seeking to improve the administration of capital 
punishment may have contributed in part to his continued assessment of the 
subject.102
In the end, though, Justice Powell clearly repudiated the death penalty 
in his interview with his former law clerk John Jeffries, which Jeffries made 
public.
 
103  As described above, Justice Powell was asked whether he would 
change any decision he had made while on the Supreme Court.  He said that 
he would change his decision in McCleskey, not just because he now 
disagreed with the outcome, but more significantly, because he now thought 
“that capital punishment should be abolished.”104
In his biography of Justice Powell, Professor John Jeffries attempted to 
explain Justice Powell’s “shift” in position on capital punishment: 
  This change in opinion 
completed the reversal from viewing capital punishment as a subject to 
which the Court ought to defer entirely to state legislatures to one in which 
the Constitution prohibited states from legislating at all. 
Why then did Powell disagree?  Why did he side in the end with Brennan and 
Marshall rather than with his traditional allies?  Why did the man who worked so hard 
to preserve the constitutionality of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia come 
twenty years later to renounce it? 
The answer lay partly in the bitter education of the cases.  From them Powell learned 
that the death penalty would never be routinely applied.  Lawyers would exploit every 
chance for delay, and judges would be sufficiently beset with doubts to give them 
frequent opportunity.  This much he learned from himself.  After fifteen years of 
capital cases, Powell knew firsthand their deadly hold on the judge’s peace of mind.  
He knew how hard it was not to take a second, third, or fourth look at rejected claims, 
how easy it seemed to put the whole thing off for one more hearing, how much 
courage—or callousness—it took to treat death like any other penalty.  Some judges 
could achieve that emotional distance, but Powell came to believe that the system as a 
whole would always be plagued by doubt and that doubting itself, it would inspire 
resentment and contempt.  Equally important was Powell’s declining regard for 
judicial restraint.105
Thus, according to Jeffries, Justice Powell’s repudiation of the death 
penalty rested on his view that it could not be fairly applied.  Rather than 
 
 
102 JEFFRIES, supra note 5, at 451. 
103 See id.  
104 See id. 
105 See id. at 452–53 (emphasis added). 
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continue to give state legislatures a chance to improve the procedures and 
add safeguards as the Court had done after Furman and throughout its 
evolving standards of decency jurisprudence, Justice Powell’s declining 
regard for the principle of judicial restraint perhaps sealed his view that the 
Court ought not to continue down the same tortured path.  For Justice 
Powell, there was no longer a reason to continue to defer to institutions, like 
state legislatures, that were unable or unwilling to remedy clear defects in 
the system.106
B. JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
 
Just three years after Justice Powell repudiated the death penalty, 
Justice Blackmun followed suit during his last term on the Supreme Court 
in 1994.107  Like Justice Powell, Justice Blackmun’s votes and opinions 
provide evidence that his reversal rested more on his changing view of the 
role of the Court vis-à-vis the state legislatures than on his normative view 
of capital punishment.108
1. Deferring to Death 
 
As indicated previously, Justice Blackmun dissented in Furman 
despite his strong feelings of antipathy for capital punishment.109
Cases such as these provide for me an excruciating agony of the spirit.  I yield to no 
one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death 
penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment 
exercised by finite minds.  That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital 
punishment serves no useful purpose that can be demonstrated. . . .  Were I a 
legislator, I would vote against the death penalty . . . .
  He wrote: 
110
Although Justice Blackmun personally agreed with the argument of the 
majority in Furman regarding the policy choice to abolish capital 
punishment, his firm belief in judicial restraint prevented him from joining 
 
 
106 The lack of legislative response to the issues in McCleskey may also have played a 
part in Justice Powell repudiating the death penalty. 
107 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
108 Whereas Justice Powell appeared largely agnostic about capital punishment when he 
arrived on the Court, Justice Blackmun had a strong dislike of capital punishment.  Indeed, 
Justice Blackmun’s record as a circuit judge revealed “his deep personal distaste for capital 
punishment, particularly his concerns about racial disparities in its imposition and his 
preference for the abolition of the death penalty through legislative and executive action 
rather than via judicial intervention.”  TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, HARRY A. BLACKMUN 96 
(2008). 
109 408 U.S. 238, 405–08 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 405–06. 
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that opinion.111
This, for me, is good argument, and it makes some sense.  But it is good argument and 
it makes sense only in a legislative and executive way and not as a judicial expedient.  
As I have said above, were I a legislator, I would do all I could to sponsor and to vote 
for legislation abolishing the death penalty.  And were I the chief executive of a 
sovereign State, I would be sorely tempted to exercise executive clemency as 
Governor Rockefeller of Arkansas did recently just before he departed from office.
  In his Furman dissent, Justice Blackmun explained his 
agreement with the majority’s argument: 
112
At this point, however, Justice Blackmun would not allow his own 




Our task here, as must so frequently be emphasized and re-emphasized, is to pass 
upon the constitutionality of legislation that has been enacted and that is challenged.  
This is the sole task for judges.  We should not allow our personal preferences as to 
the wisdom of legislative and congressional action, or our distaste for such action, to 
guide our judicial decision in cases such as these.  The temptations to cross that policy 
line are very great.  In fact, as today’s decision reveals, they are almost irresistible.
  Instead of imposing his own normative view, Justice 
Blackmun demonstrated the degree to which he valued judicial restraint.  
He continued by stating: 
114
Justice Blackmun perhaps best summed up the tension between his 
personal views on capital punishment and his view to his role as a Justice 
and the corresponding requirement of judicial restraint to state legislatures 
when he said, “Although personally I may rejoice at the Court’s result, I 
find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of 
constitutional pronouncement.  I fear the Court has overstepped.  It has 
sought and has achieved an end.”
 
115
This view continued as the Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg 
and a series of companion cases in 1976.  In all five cases decided that day, 
Gregg,
 
116 Jurek,117 Proffitt,118 Woodson,119 and Roberts,120
 
111 See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 113 (2005). 
 Justice 
Blackmun voted in favor of allowing the death penalty under each of the 
state statutory schemes.  He voted to uphold the mandatory death sentence 
112 Furman, 408 U.S. at 405–06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
113 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
114 Furman, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. at 414. 
116 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).  See supra discussion, Part II, subpart III.A. 
117 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
118 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976). 
119 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).  See supra discussion, subpart 
III.A. 
120 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976). 
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schemes in North Carolina and Louisiana, again based on his view of 
judicial restraint.121  To Justice Blackmun, the establishment and 
functioning of such capital schemes was the purview of the state 
legislatures and not that of the Supreme Court.  Thus, Justice Blackmun 
initially held firm to his Furman position that the Court should not use the 
Constitution (specifically the Eighth Amendment) to restrict the ability of 
the states to fashion capital schemes in a manner of their own choosing.122
2. Regulating Death 
 
While embracing the view that it was not appropriate for the Court to 
use its power to abolish the death penalty, Justice Blackmun indicated, not 
long after the Gregg cases, that it was appropriate for the Court to restrict 
its use in some contexts.  Thus, Justice Blackmun went along with the 
Court’s constitutionalizing of the death penalty when he voted with the 
majority in Coker v. Georgia.123
Unlike in the Gregg cases, where thirty-eight state legislatures had 
enacted new statutes after Furman, only three states provided for death as a 
penalty for rape after Furman.
 
124
Further, the Court used its majoritarian evolving standards of decency 
construct as a basis for finding that death as a punishment for rape was 
cruel and unusual.
  Accordingly, the infringement by the 
Court on the power of the state legislatures here was comparatively 
insignificant. 
125
if the “most marked indication of society’s endorsement of the death penalty for 
murder is the legislati
  The Court explained that 
ve response to Furman,” it should also be a telling datum that 
the public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes providing the 
punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different.  In revivi
 
121 His opinion in all of these cases was almost identical: “I dissent for the reasons set 
forth in my dissent in Furman v. Georgia, and in the other dissenting opinions I joined in 
that case.”  Roberts, 428 U.S. at 363 (internal citations omitted); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 307–
08 (internal citations omitted).  
ng death penalty 
122 Justice Blackmun thus, unlike Justices Powell and Stevens, did not cross the threshold 
of “constitutionalizing” capital punishment until after Gregg. 
123 433 U.S. 584, 599 (1977) (“[T]he death sentence imposed on Coker is a 
disproportionate punishment for rape.”).  As discussed supra, the Court in Coker held that 
the Constitution prohibited the use of the death penalty for the rape of an adult woman 
because it was a disproportionate punishment.  Id. 
124 Id. at 594.  Indeed, there had never been a majority of death penalty states that 
permitted death for rape.  Id. 
125 Id. (“This public judgment as to the acceptability of capital punishment, evidenced by 
the immediate, post-Furman legislative reaction in a large majority of the States, heavily 
influenced the Court to sustain the death penalty for murder in Gregg v. Georgia.”). 
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laws to satisfy Furman’s mandate, none of the States that had not previously 
authorized death for rape chose to include rape among capital felonies.126
Thus, while “[t]he current judgment with respect to the death penalty 
for rape [was] not wholly unanimous among state legislatures,”
 
127 the 
Court’s application of its evolving standards of decency analysis found that 
the trend among state legislatures “obviously weighs very heavily on the 
side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult 
woman.”128
Based upon this language, Justice Blackmun’s willingness to vote with 
the majority and abandon his deferential approach to state legislatures in 
agreeing that the Constitution barred the imposition of death for rape does 
not seem such a significant abandonment of his earlier position.
 
129  The 
additional language from the Court in its decision, however, reveals that the 
Court indeed took a significant step beyond just relying on the majoritarian 
state legislative trend.  The Court stressed that, in addition to examining the 
trends in the various states, it was required to impose its own independent 
judgment to determine whether the statute contravened the appropriate 
evolving standard of decency.130
These recent e
  The Court explained: 
vents evidencing the attitude of state legislatures and sentencing juries 
do not wholly determine this controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the 
end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of 
the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.  Nevertheless, the legislative 
rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly confirms our own judgment, which is 
that death is indeed a disproportionate penalty for the crime of raping an adult 
woman.131
By subscribing to the evolving standards of decency method of 
interpretation, presumably Justice Blackmun acquiesced to the concept that, 
based in part on the practices of state legislatures, Justices were to use their 
own interpretive judgment to decide which state capital practices and 
procedures violated the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.
 
132
In Lockett v. Ohio, Justice Blackmun again showed his hesitancy to 
use the Eighth Amendment to restrict the power of states to structure their 
 
 
126 Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 (1976)). 
127 Id. at 595. 
128 Id. at 596. 
129 In many ways, this is not so different from the Gregg line of cases.  See discussion 
supra Part II. 
130 Coker, 433 U.S. at 603 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring). 
131 Id. at 597. 
132 In Gardner v. Florida, Justice Blackmun again showed his willingness to follow the 
Gregg line.  430 U.S. 349, 364 (1977) (holding that petitioner was denied due process of law 
when death sentence was imposed on the basis of undisclosed information in the presentence 
report). 
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capital schemes as they wished.133  In Lockett, the petitioner, the driver of a 
get-away car, challenged a state law that limited the ability of a criminal 
defendant to put on mitigating evidence at a capital sentencing hearing.134  
Eschewing the position of the majority (which applied Woodson), Justice 
Blackmun would have found for the petitioner on alternative criminal 
procedure grounds, while reaffirming his commitment to judicial 
restraint.135
Though heretofore I have been unwilling to interfere with the legislative judgment of 
the States in regard to capital sentencing procedures, . . . this Court’s judgment as to 
disproportionality in 
  He explained: 
Coker, in which I joined, and the unusual degree to which Ohio 
requires capital punishment of a mere aider and abettor in an armed felony resulting in 
a fatality even where no participant specifically intended the fatal use of a weapon, . . . 
provides a significant occasion for setting some limit to the method by which the 
States assess punishment for actions less immediately connected to the deliberate 
taking of human life.136
Again, Justice Blackmun was not unduly troubled by this restriction 
placed on state capital processes because the “impact” was not particularly 
significant in limiting the practices of large numbers of states.  To that point 
Justice Blackmun acknowledged that, “[o]f 34 States that now have capital 
statutes, 18 specify that a minor degree of participation in a homicide may 
be considered by the sentencing authority, and, of the remaining 16 States, 
9 allow consideration of any mitigating factor.”
 
137
Despite these initial concerns for restraint and deference to state 
legislatures, Justice Blackmun became increasingly, but not always, willing 
to vote to strike down procedures under the Eighth Amendment that he 
deemed unfair.
 
138  In Barefoot v. Estelle, Justice Blackmun took a more 
significant step towards abandoning judicial restraint.139
 
133 438 U.S. 586, 613 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
  Justice Blackmun 
dissented in Barefoot, which held that psychiatric evidence could sustain 
134 Id. at 590–93. 
135 Id. at 613–19 (holding the application of the Ohio death penalty statute impermissible 
on alternative grounds, namely that it did not allow for consideration of Ms. Lockett’s mens 
rea) (Blackmun, J., concurring).  
136 Id. at 616 (internal citation omitted). 
137 Id. at 616–17.  Justice Blackmun likewise concurred in Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 
643 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), a companion 
case to Lockett, largely for the same reasons. 
138 For instance, compare Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that the 
imposition of a death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment), with Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
455 U.S. 104, 120 (1979) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment did not proscribe the 
imposition of a death sentence). 
139 463 U.S. 880 (1983). 
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the death sentence of a defendant under the Texas capital system.140  Justice 
Blackmun’s opinion took issue not only with the evidence admitted in the 
case, but also with the Texas system as a whole in its reliance on future 
dangerousness: 
The Court holds that psychiatric testimony about a defendant’s future dangerousness 
is admissible, despite the fact that such testimony is wrong two times out of three.  
The Court reaches this result—even in a capital case—because, it is said, the 
testimony is subject to cross-examination and impeachment. . . .  In a capital case, the 
specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored in the eyes of an impressionable jury by 
the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s words, equates with death 
itself.141 
Justice Blackmun likewise dissented in Barclay v. Florida, where the 
Court upheld a death sentence despite the trial court’s error in instructing 
the jury incorrectly as to one of the aggravating factors.142
[W]hen a State chooses to impose capital punishment, as this Court has held a State 
presently has the right to do, it must be imposed by the rule of law. . . [especially 
based on] the fragility, in Barclay’s case, of the application of Florida’s established 
law.  The errors and missteps—intentional or otherwise—come close to making a 
mockery of the Florida statute, and are too much for me to condone.
  Justice 
Blackmun again valued fairness of process over judicial restraint: 
143
Justice Blackmun, however, was not yet committed to a complete 





140 Id. at 916.  To obtain a death sentence in Texas, the State is required to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that “there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts 
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN., art. 37.071(b)(2) (West 1981). 
  In Spaziano, the Court upheld the ability of the 
judge under Florida’s capital punishment scheme to override the jury’s 
141 Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  For a more lengthy exposition 
on the problems of using future dangerousness in capital cases, see William W. Berry III, 
Ending Death by Dangerousness, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 889 (2010). 
142 463 U.S. 939 (1983).  The trial court improperly considered the defendant’s prior 
criminal record as an aggravating factor.  Id. at 946.  Because there were other aggravating 
factors and no mitigating factors, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the 
error was harmless.  Id. at 958.  
143 Id. at 991 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun reached a similar conclusion 
in California v. Ramos, dissenting because “[t]he Court, on its own, redefines the issue in 
terms of the dangerousness of the respondent, an issue that involves jury consideration of the 
probability that respondent will commit acts of violence in the future.  By doing so the Court 
approves the Briggs Instruction by substituting an intellectual sleight of hand for legal 
analysis.  This kind of appellate review compounds the original unfairness of the instruction 
itself, and thereby does the rule of law disservice.”  463 U.S. 992, 1029 (1983) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
144 468 U.S. 447 (1984). 
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determination and impose a death sentence.145  Despite a majority of 
jurisdictions choosing to use the jury, and not the judge, as the final 
sentencing decisionmaker in capital cases, the Court (and Justice 
Blackmun) chose to defer to the scheme adopted by the state legislature.146  
The Court explained that “‘[a]lthough the judgments of legislatures, juries, 
and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance, it is for us ultimately to judge 
whether the Eighth Amendment’ is violated by a challenged practice.”147  
Here, the Court stressed that they could not conclude “that placing 
responsibility on the trial judge to impose the sentence in a capital case is 
unconstitutional.”148
As the Court several times has made clear, we are unwilling to say that there is any 
one right way for a State to set up its capital sentencing scheme . . . .  We are not 
persuaded that placing the responsibility on a trial judge to impose the sentence in a 
capital case is so fundamentally at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and 
decency that Florida must be required to alter its scheme and give final authority to 
the jury to make the life-or-death decision.
  Emphasizing their deferential approach, the Court 
finally noted that: 
149
Up to this point Justice Blackmun had adhered to the concept of 
judicial restraint, often deferring to state legislatures while occasionally 
finding certain procedural aspects of specific state capital punishment 
schemes to be unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.  Justice 
Blackmun, however, would soon find himself on the brink of complete 
abandonment of any remaining judicial restraint in moving toward the 
complete repudiation of death. 
 
3. Repudiating Death 
Two cases arguably accelerated Justice Blackmun’s shift150 from 
deference toward abolition: McCleskey v. Kemp151
 
145 Id. 
 (discussed above) and 
146 Id. at 464 (“The fact that a majority of jurisdictions have adopted a different practice, 
however, does not establish that contemporary standards of decency are offended by the jury 
override.  The Eighth Amendment is not violated every time a State reaches a conclusion 
different from a majority of its sisters over how best to administer its criminal laws.”). 
147 Id. 
148 468 U.S. at 464. 
149 Id. at 464–65 (internal citations omitted). 
150 See Stephen L. Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: Transformation from “Minnesota 
Twin” to Independent Voice, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 63, 
70 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991) (noting that “[a]lthough it did not 
start immediately, since the ‘early Blackmun’ lasted at least several terms, Blackmun’s 
change, if not completely linear, has been clear over time”). 
151 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
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Herrera v. Collins.152
The Court today sanctions the execution of a man despite his presentation of evidence 
that establishes a constitutionally intolerable level of racially based discrimination 
leading to the imposition of his death sentence.  I am disappointed with the Court’s 
action not only because of its denial of constitutional guarantees to petitioner 
McCleskey individually, but also because of its departure from what seems to me to 
be well-developed constitutional jurisprudence.
  In McCleskey, Justice Blackmun wrote separately in 
dissent to express his dismay with the outcome: 
153
To Justice Blackmun, the Baldus study showed that “there exist[ed] in 
the Georgia capital sentencing scheme a risk of racially based 
discrimination that is so acute that it violates the Eighth Amendment”; the 
Furman problem had reappeared, and the Georgia death sentence should be 
declared unconstitutional.
 
154  He explained that “because capital cases 
involve the State’s imposition of a punishment that is unique both in kind 
and degree, the decision in such cases must reflect a heightened degree of 
reliability under the Amendment’s prohibition of the infliction of cruel and 
unusual punishments.”155
In Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court upheld procedural bars to 
Herrera’s claim of actual innocence on habeas appeal.
  The clear absence of reliability, as shown by 
Baldus, and the grim prospects of the states curing this defect may have 
moved Blackmun one step closer to abandoning restraint entirely. 
156  Justice Blackmun 
again dissented, expressing shock at the decision to foreclose the ability to 
bring a claim of innocence, even though technically procedurally barred, 
stating, “Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of 




The Court’s enumeration of the constitutional rights of criminal defendants surely is 
entirely beside the point.  These protections sometimes fail.  We really are being 
asked to decide whether the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has 
been validly convicted and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence 
with newly discovered evidence.  Despite the State of Texas’ astonishing protestation 
to the contrary, I do not see how the answer can be anything but “yes.”158
 
152 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 
153 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 345 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
154 Id.  
155 Id. 
156 506 U.S. 390 (1993).  Herrera sought to prove his innocence by introducing an 
affidavit signed by his then-deceased brother that admitted to committing the homicide for 
which Herrera was found guilty.  Id. at 393. 
157 Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
158 Id. at 430–31 (internal citations omitted). 
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After a lengthy exposition of his view of the shortcomings in the majority’s 
reasoning, Justice Blackmun concluded by criticizing the Court’s restraint 
to the state legislatures in capital cases: 
I have voiced disappointment over this Court’s obvious eagerness to do away with 
any restriction on the States’ power to execute whomever and however they please.  I 
have also expressed doubts about whether, in the absence of such restrictions, capital 
punishment remains constitutional at all.  Of one thing, however, I am certain.  Just as 
an execution without adequate safeguards is unacceptable, so too is an execution 
when the condemned prisoner can prove that he is innocent.  The execution of a 
person who can show that he is innocent comes perilously close to simple murder.159




It was not until Callins v. Collins that Justice Blackmun truly crossed 
the second threshold, repudiating the death penalty in a dissent to the denial 
of certiorari.
 
161  After the opinion was released, Justice Brennan, “frail and 
four years into retirement, telephoned and left word for Blackmun: thank 
you for ‘the present.’”162  In his dissent, Justice Blackmun gave an 
extensive exposition of why he had reversed his position.163
First, he cited what he saw as the Supreme Court’s abdication of its 
duty to oversee the state legislatures in the administration of the death 
penalty.  In other words, Justice Blackmun believed that the Court had 
accorded the states too much deference by not holding them accountable to 
the requirements of Furman (restrictions that he ironically opposed in the 
first place).  He explained: 
 
On their face, these goals of individual fairness, reasonable consistency, and absence 
of error appear to be attainable: Courts are in the very business of erecting procedural 
devices from which fair, equitable, and reliable outcomes are presumed to flow.  Yet, 
in the death penalty area, this Court, in my view, has engaged in a futile effort to 
balance these constitutional demands, and now is retreating not only from the Furman 
 
159 Id. at 446 (citations omitted). 
160 See GREENHOUSE, supra note 111, at 176 (“In his Herrera dissent, Blackmun had 
come close to disavowing capital punishment entirely.  But still he did not cross the line, as 
his longtime colleagues William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall had done.”). 
161 510 U.S. 1141, 1143–59 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).  
Linda Greenhouse describes this turning point in her biography of Blackmun: “Now, 
approaching his eighty-fifth birthday, it was time.  He told his law clerks to go ahead and 
draft an opinion by which he would renounce the death penalty.”  See GREENHOUSE, supra 
note 111, at 177.  She explained, “[f]or him, capital punishment remained conceptually 
acceptable, at a level of theory; he had decided that in practice, it could not be made to 
operate in a constitutionally acceptable way.”  Id. at 179. 
162 See GREENHOUSE, supra note 111, at 179. 
163 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1149 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that discretion could not 
be eliminated from capital sentencing without threatening the fundamental fairness due a 
defendant when life is at stake). 
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promise of consistency and rationality, but from the requirement of individualized 
sentencing as well.  Having virtually conceded that both fairness and rationality 
cannot be achieved in the administration of the death penalty, the Court has chosen to 
deregulate the entire enterprise, replacing, it would seem, substantive constitutional 
requirements with mere esthetics, and abdicating its statutorily and constitutionally 
imposed duty to provide meaningful judicial oversight to the administration of death 
by the States.164
Interestingly, though, Justice Blackmun’s solution was not to reinforce 
the Furman principles and demand that the states be brought back into line, 
like the Court did in Furman and Gregg.  Instead, he chose, as indicated in 
the famous quote below, to repudiate the death penalty by having the Court 
remove the ability of the states to use capital punishment.  Justice 
Blackmun wrote: 
 
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.  For more 
than 20 years I have endeavored—indeed, I have struggled—along with a majority of 
this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the 
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor.  Rather than continue to 
coddle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and 
the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply 
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed.  It is virtually self-evident to 
me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can 
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.  The basic 
question—does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendants 
“deserve” to die?—cannot be answered in the affirmative . . . .  The problem is that 
the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must 
wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and 
reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution.165
Justice Blackmun thus concluded that the abandonment of judicial 
restraint was justified by the impossibility of creating a system that was 
acceptable under the Constitution.  In this vein, Justice Blackmun revisited 
Furman, stating that “[t]here is little doubt now that Furman’s essential 
holding was correct,”
 
166 as “it surely is beyond dispute that if the death 
penalty cannot be administered consistently and rationally, it may not be 
administered at all.”167
 
164 Id. at 1144–45 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 n.37 (1987)). 
  He explained his abandonment of restraint as 
follows: 
165 Id. at 1130 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
166 Id. at 1147.  Justice Blackmun explained further, “in my mind, the real meaning of 
Furman’s diverse concurring opinions did not emerge until some years after Furman was 
decided” and stated that “Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a sentencing 
body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or 
spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of 
wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”  Id. at 1147–48 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 
at 189 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)). 
167 Id. (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)). 
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I have explained at length on numerous occasions that my willingness to enforce the 
capital punishment statutes enacted by the States and the Federal Government, 
“notwithstanding my own deep moral reservations . . . has always rested on an 
understanding that certain procedural safeguards, chief among them the federal 
judiciary’s power to reach and correct claims of constitutional error on federal habeas 
review, would ensure that death sentences are fairly imposed.”  In recent years, I have 
grown increasingly skeptical that “the death penalty really can be imposed fairly and 
in accordance with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment,” given the now 
limited ability of the federal courts to remedy constitutional errors.168
Finally, Justice Blackmun concluded his repudiation of death with a 
note of hopefulness.
 
169  It was not a hope that the states could somehow 
right their course and devise (with the Court’s help) a death penalty scheme 
that satisfied the requirements of Furman and the Eighth Amendment.170  
Instead, it was a hope that a majority of Justices would reach the same 
conclusion that he had and repudiate the death penalty.171
C. JUSTICE STEVENS 
 
1. Deferring to Death 
Justice John Paul Stevens did not join the United States Supreme Court 
until 1975, three years after Furman v. Georgia had been decided.  Like 
Justices Powell and Blackmun, Justice Stevens valued judicial restraint to 
other political institutions in his early years as a judge.172
The prevalence of widespread potential for error among other decisionmakers is one 
of the factors that repeatedly prompts invitations to federal judges to substitute their 
views for the erroneous conclusions of others . . . .  [T]he temptation to accept and 
invitation of this kind is always alluring, but whenever the federal judiciary does 
accept, three things inevitably happen.  First, our workload increases and our ability to 
process it effectively diminishes . . . .  Second, the potential for diverse decisions by 
other decisionmakers is diminished and another step in the direction of nationwide 
uniformity is taken . . . .  And third, we substitute our mistakes for the mistakes 
theretofore made by others.  Sometimes that price is well worth paying; it is, however, 
a cost of which we should always be conscious.
  Just a year before 
his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Stevens, then a circuit judge, 
explained his views on restraint in a speech at Northwestern University 
School of Law: 
173
 
168 Id. at 1157 (citations omitted). 
 
169 Id. at 1159. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 ROBERT JUDD SICKELS, JOHN PAUL STEVENS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE SEARCH FOR 
BALANCE 30 (1988) (explaining how Justice Stevens retained, at least for a while, a strong 
belief in restraint).  
173 Id. 
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During his confirmation hearing, then-Judge Stevens was asked about 
his view of judicial restraint: 
Senator Scott of Virginia: So I ask you, and I think it is entirely proper to ask, when 
you become a member of the Supreme Court—and I have no real doubt that you 
will—is it your intention to exercise judicial restraint? 
Judge Stevens: Yes, it is, Senator.  I think it is the business of a judge to decide cases 
that come before him.  From time to time, in the process of deciding cases, important 
decisions are made and the law takes a little different turn from time to time.  But it 
has always been my philosophy to decide cases on the narrowest ground possible and 
not to reach out for constitutional questions.  I think that is the tradition of the work of 
the Supreme Court and I think the Court is most effective when it does its own 
business the best.174
Thus, Justice Stevens shared the initial perspective of Justices Powell 
and Blackmun that the role of the Supreme Court Justice was not to 
substitute his or her personal political views for the prior law, whether 
common law or statutory. 
 
As discussed above in subpart III.A, Justice Stevens, as one of the 
three Justices in the controlling plurality (termed the “Powell plurality” 
above), agreed to cross the initial threshold of constitutionalizing capital 
punishment by applying the Eighth Amendment to it, but did so in large 
part because the chosen standard, the evolving standards of decency, still 
accorded significant restraint to state legislatures.175
Similarly, Justice Stevens agreed with the majority (and Justice 
Blackmun) in Coker, where as discussed above the Court took two 
important steps in establishing the evolving standards of decency 
approach.
 
176  First, the Court emphasized that state legislatures (and juries) 
determined, in large part, what the appropriate standard was.177  Second, the 
Court explained that its own judgment as to the appropriate standard of 
decency, and not its examination of the states’ practices, ultimately 
determined what practices were constitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment.178
 
174 Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 35–36, reprinted 
in 8A THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL 
AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE, 1916–1975, at 35–36 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1977) 
(testimony of John Paul Stevens, Dec. 8, 1975). 
  Thus, while seemingly resting its decision on the notion of 
175 See id.; see also Berry, supra note 70. 
176 See discussion supra subpart III.B. 
177 See discussion supra subpart III.B; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
178 Coker, 433 U.S. at 584 (“[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own 
judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty 
under the Eighth Amendment.”)  
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restraint to the states, the majority (including Justice Stevens) was careful to 
carve out analytical room to choose not to defer in the future.179  The Court 
reiterated both of these views years later in Atkins v. Virginia and again in 
Roper v. Simmons.180
2. Regulating Death 
 
Two competing principles framed Justice Stevens’s approach in the 
post-Gregg cases.  On the one hand, because there can be no perfect way to 
administer a death penalty system, the Court ought to defer generally to 
state legislatures unless their administration of capital punishment is 
fundamentally unfair.181  On the other hand, Justice Stevens recognized the 
heightened need for the Court to intervene to ensure the reliability and 
fairness of the imposition of death sentences.182  This second principle was 
based in large part on the Justices’ notion that “death is different,” and 
accordingly gave the Court a stronger interest in regulating its use by the 
states.183  Thus, concluded Justice Stevens, “although not every 
imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, 
to set aside a state-court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates 




180 See discussion infra Part III. 
181 See, e.g., Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 n. 13 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 192–95 (1976). 
182 See, e.g., Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616–17 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(noting that, as “death is not reversible,” DNA evidence that the convictions of numerous 
persons on death row were erroneous is especially alarming); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 
447, 460 n.7 (1984) (“[T]he death sentence is unique in its severity and in its 
irrevocability . . . .”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (“There is no question that 
death as a punishment is unique in its severity and irrevocability.”); Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (stating that death differs from life imprisonment 
because of its “finality”); see also Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and 
the Role of the Capital Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117 (2004). 
183 See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884–85 (1983) (“Two themes have been 
reiterated in our opinions discussing the procedures required by the Constitution in capital 
sentencing determinations.  On the one hand . . . there can be no perfect procedure for 
deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death.  On the 
other hand, because there is a qualitative difference between death and any other permissible 
form of punishment, there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.”) (internal citations 
omitted).  This is true, of course, because “[i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to 
the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on 
reason rather than caprice or emotion.”  Id. at 885 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 
358 (1977)). 
184 Id. at 885. 
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Although Justice Stevens voted in the Gregg majority, he only voted 
that way because he believed that states would provide significant 
procedural safeguards to capital punishment defendants.185  Justice Stevens 
was a firm believer in fundamental fairness and making sure the states 
comported with due process.186  In Barclay v. Florida, Justice Stevens 
explained, “[f]urther, a constant theme of our cases—from Gregg and 
Proffitt through Godfrey, Eddings, and most recently Zant—has been 
emphasis on procedural protections that are intended to ensure that the 
death penalty will be imposed in a consistent, rational manner[,]”187 again 
reasoning that procedural and fundamental fairness were essential to death 
penalty jurisprudence.  What is more important, however, is the first sign of 
Justice Stevens’s personal view of the death penalty: “The cursory analysis 
in the two opinions upholding petitioner’s death sentence—which 
admittedly I do not applaud—does not require us to set aside the sentence 
when we have determined that the sentence itself does not suffer from any 
constitutional flaw.”188
Indeed, in Pulley v. Harris, Justice Stevens voted to uphold the state’s 
procedure, despite a clear opportunity to do otherwise.
 
189  He concurred 
with Justice White’s majority opinion, which held that the Constitution did 
not require states to implement proportionality review.190  The Court's belief 
here was that the states could implement capital punishment via a number 
of different legislative mechanisms so long as they provided some level of 
safeguard as required by Furman.191  Justice Stevens therefore was willing 
to defer to the method adopted by the state legislatures so long as it 
achieved the proper ends: protection against arbitrariness.  He thus voted to 
defer to the state’s scheme despite his belief that “the case law does 
establish that appellate review plays an essential role in eliminating the 
systemic arbitrariness and capriciousness which infected death penalty 
schemes invalidated by Furman v. Georgia, and hence that some form of 
meaningful appellate review is constitutionally required.”192  Justice 
Stevens’s view that appellate review was an essential element stemmed 
back to Furman v. Georgia and its basic concept of eliminating the 
arbitrariness and capriciousness for death penalty imposition.193
 
185 Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977). 
 
186 Id. at 358. 
187 Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
188 Id. at 974 (emphasis added). 
189 465 U.S. 37 (1984). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at 54 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
193 Id. at 55. 
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Even as Justice Stevens was advocating judicial restraint, he began to 
develop the fundamental fairness principle in other cases, as evidenced by 
his opinion in Spaziano v. Florida.194  Justice Stevens’s Spaziano opinion 
disagreed with the majority view that the judge could overrule the jury 
sentence in a death case.195  He based his lack of restraint toward the 
Florida scheme on the second of the above principles—that the uniqueness 
of death supported heightened scrutiny.196
The concept of due process permits no such deprivation—whether of life, liberty, or 
property—to occur if it is grossly excessive in the particular case—if it is “cruel and 
unusual punishment” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment . . . [f]or although we look 
to state law as the source of the right to property, “it is not the source of liberty, and 
surely not the exclusive source.”  Because a deprivation of liberty is qualitatively 
different from a deprivation of property, heightened procedural safeguards are a 
hallmark of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence.  But that jurisprudence has also 
unequivocally established that a State’s deprivation of a person’s life is also 
qualitatively different from any lesser intrusion on liberty.
  He explained: 
197
Justice Stevens then explained why allowing a judge to overrule a jury 
contravenes the role of the community as the ultimate decisionmaker of life 
or death: 
 
Because it is the one punishment that cannot be prescribed by a rule of law as judges 
normally understand such rules, but rather is ultimately understood only as an 
expression of the community’s outrage—its sense that an individual has lost his moral 
entitlement to live—I am convinced that the danger of an excessive response can only 
be avoided if the decision to impose the death penalty is made by a jury, rather than 
by a single governmental official.198 
He added: 
 
194 468 U.S. 447 (1984). 
If the State wishes to execute a citizen, it must persuade a jury of his peers that death 
is an appropriate punishment for his offense.  If it cannot do so, then I do not believe it 
195 Id. at 467 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
196 As Justice Stevens pointed out, every member of the Court had, at that point, 
subscribed to the “death is different” doctrine: “In the 12 years since Furman v. Georgia, 
every Member of this Court has written or joined at least one opinion endorsing the 
proposition that because of its severity and irrevocability, the death penalty is qualitatively 
different from any other punishment, and hence must be accompanied by unique safeguards 
to ensure that it is a justified response to a given offense.”  Id. at 468 (citation omitted); see 
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 227, 289 (1983); id. at 306 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Enmund v. 
Florida, 458 U. S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625, 637–638 (1980); 
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 272 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586, 604–605 
(1978) (plurality opinion); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 598 (1977) (plurality opinion); 
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U. S. 349, 357–58 (1977) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U. S. 153, 188 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). 
197 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
198 Id. at 469–70. 
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can be said with an acceptable degree of assurance that imposition of the death 
penalty would be consistent with the community’s sense of proportionality.199
For Justice Stevens, then, the Court ought to intervene where the 
decision to sentence a defendant to death did not reflect the community 
sentiment.  In other words, like Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens was 
willing to use the death-is-different principle as a means to regulate state 
legislatures when doing so did not undermine the popular political will (as 
reflected in jury decisions). 
 
Justice Stevens reiterated this principle in McCleskey.200  Citing 
Gardner,201 Zant,202 and Spaziano,203 he emphasized the importance of 
scrutinizing death decisions and the requirement that such decisions be 
based on reason and not emotion, particularly where the jury decision may 
have been influenced by race.204  For Justice Stevens, “[t]his sort of 
disparity is constitutionally intolerable.”205
While Justice Stevens then pointed out that the majority’s opinion 
“flagrantly 
 
violate[d] the Court’s prior ‘insistence that capital punishment 
be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all,’”206
One of the lessons of the Baldus study is that there exist certain categories of 
extremely serious crimes for which prosecutors consistently seek, and juries 
consistently impose, the death penalty without regard to the race of the victim or the 
race of the offender.  If Georgia were to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants 
to those categories, the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the death 
penalty would be significantly decreased, if not eradicated.
 he did 
not think that the Baldus study’s results necessarily foreclosed the use of 
the death penalty.  As he explained, 
207
Therefore, while McCleskey moved Justice Blackmun towards repudiation, 
Justice Stevens again saw a possibility for forcing the states to continue to 
improve upon the capital sentencing process to cure its defects. 
 
Nonetheless, Justice Stevens continued over time to intervene deeper 
and deeper into the state capital processes, voting repeatedly to restrict the 
death penalty in various ways.  Again, fundamental fairness played the 
 
199 Id. at 490. 
200 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); see discussion supra, subparts III.A and 
III.B.(describing the majority opinion by Justice Powell and Justice Blackmun’s dissenting 
opinion). 
201 430 U.S. at 358. 
202 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1982). 
203 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 469 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
204 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 366 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 366–67 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)). 
207 Id. at 367. 
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central role in Justice Stevens’s views.208  The most significant of these 
decisions are the victim impact evidence cases and the “defendant 
characteristics” cases.  In Booth v. Maryland,209 South Carolina v. 
Gathers,210 and Payne v. Tennessee,211
The fact that each of us is unique is a proposition so obvious that it surely requires no 
evidentiary support.  What is not obvious, however, is the way in which the character 
or reputation in one case may differ from that of other possible victims.  Evidence 
offered to prove such differences can only be intended to identify some victims as 
more worthy of protection than others.  Such proof risks decisions based on the same 
invidious motives as a prosecutor’s decision to seek the death penalty if a victim is 
white, but to accept a plea bargain if the victim is black.
 Justice Stevens voted against 
allowing victim impact testimony and evidence into evidence at death 
penalty trials, holding that admission of such evidence during the penalty 
phase of a capital trial was unconstitutional.  In his dissent in Payne, Justice 
Stevens explained why he believed that such evidence violates the 
Constitution: 
212
Perhaps more importantly, Justice Stevens revealed a growing distrust 
with state institutions based on the rise of penal populism:
 
213
Given the current popularity of capital punishment in a crime-ridden society, the 
political appeal of arguments that assume that increasing the severity of sentences is 
the best cure for the cancer of crime, and the political strength of the “victims’ rights” 
movement, I recognize that today’s decision will be greeted with enthusiasm by a 
large number of concerned and thoughtful citizens.  The great tragedy of the decision, 
however, is the danger that the “hydraulic pressure” of public opinion that Justice 
Holmes once described—and that properly influences the deliberations of democratic 
legislatures—has played a role not only in the Court’s decision to hear this case, and 
in its decision to reach the constitutional question without pausing to consider 
affirming on the basis of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s rationale, but even in its 





208 See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U.S. 420, 428 (1980)) (“It is therefore an integral component of a State’s constitutional 
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious 
infliction of the death penalty.”). 
 
209 482 U.S. 496, 509 (1987). 
210 490 U.S. 805, 812 (1990). 
211 501 U.S. 808, 866 (1991). 
212 Id. at 866 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
213 See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL (2001); JOHN PRATT, 
PENAL POPULISM (2006).  See also William W. Berry III, Extraordinary and Compelling: A 
Re-examination of the Justifications for Compassionate Release, 68 MD. L. REV. 850 (2009) 
(discussing the rampant level of imprisonment in the United States). 
214 Payne, 501 U.S. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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From 1991 to 2002, Justice Stevens continued to move toward 
repudiating capital punishment.215  He consistently voted to restrict the use 
of the death penalty where he believed that the states’ use was 
“fundamentally unfair” or infringed upon “human dignity.”216
Justice Stevens’s increasing disdain for states and their inability to use 
the death penalty in a fair way paralleled the Court’s broadening of the 
evolving standards of decency doctrine that began in 2002.  In Atkins v. 
Virginia,
 
217 Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion banning the 
execution of individuals who are mentally retarded, reversing the Court’s 
decision in Penry v. Lynaugh just thirteen years earlier.218  Applying the 
evolving standards of decency standard, the Court found that, even though a 
majority of states had not banned capital punishment for mentally retarded 
individuals (eighteen states),219 the trend among the states was moving in 
the direction of banning execution of such individuals.220  In light of several 
states recently banning the execution of mentally retarded individuals, 
Justice Stevens reasoned that “[i]t is not so much the number of these States 
that is significant, but the consistency of the direction of change.”221
 
215 See infra note 
  
Perhaps equally important was the fact that “even among those States that 
217. 
216 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 361 (1992) (“[F]undamental fairness is more 
than accuracy at trial.”); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 377 (1993) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Fretwell v. Lockhart, 754 F. 2d 258 (8th Cir. 1991)) (“‘[F]undamental 
unfairness exists when a prisoner receives a death sentence rather than life imprisonment 
solely because of his attorney’s error.’”); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 981 (1994) 
(“I believe, that the failure to characterize factors such as the age of the defendant or the 
circumstances of the crime as either aggravating or mitigating is also unobjectionable.”); 
Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067, 1067 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) 
(“In my opinion, it is fundamentally unfair for the State of Texas to go forward with the 
execution of Jesse Dewayne Jacobs.”); Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 
293–94 (1998) (“For ‘death is a different kind of punishment from any other which may be 
imposed in this country.’”); Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 189 (2002) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“A rule that allows the State to foist a murder victim’s lawyer onto his accused 
is not only capricious; it poisons the integrity of our adversary system of justice.”).  
217 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
218 492 U.S. 302 (1989). 
219 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002).  
220 Id. at 315–17.  
221 Id. at 315.  Interestingly, Justice Stevens found this trend more compelling because it 
moved against the direction of the penal populism he had emphasized in Payne.  Id. at 315–
16 (“Given the well-known fact that anticrime legislation is far more popular than legislation 
providing protections for persons guilty of violent crime, the large number of States 
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons (and the complete absence of States 
passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such executions) provides powerful 
evidence that today our society views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less 
culpable than the average criminal.”). 
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regularly execute offenders and that have no prohibition with regard to the 
mentally retarded, only five have executed offenders possessing a known 
IQ less than 70 since we decided Penry.”222
As in earlier cases, the Court likewise “brought to bear”
 
223 its own 
judgment, finding that the evolving standard of decency warranted this 
prohibition.224  Justice Stevens explained that “[t]his is the judgment of 
most of the legislatures that have recently addressed the matter, and we 
have no reason to disagree with that judgment for purposes of construing 
and applying the Eighth Amendment.”225
Separate from its interpretation of the consensus among state 
legislatures, the Court analyzed the degree to which permitting such 
executions “will measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive 
purpose of the death penalty.”
 
226
[t]his consensus unquestionably reflects widespread judgment about the relative 
culpability of mentally retarded offenders, and the relationship between mental 
retardation and the penological purposes served by the death penalty.  Additionally, it 
suggests that some characteristics of mental retardation undermine the strength of the 
procedural protections that our capital jurisprudence steadfastly guards.
  In its independent evaluation, the Court 
explained its belief that: 
227
As a result, the Court concluded that “such punishment is excessive and that 
the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to 
take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.”
 
228
While the Court at the very least feigned some level of restraint to the 
state legislatures, Justice Stevens (and the Court) made it explicit, in a 
manner more demonstrated than before, that they could and should be 
making such policy judgments as the one decided here—whether it was 
acceptable to execute mentally retarded individuals.  Justice Stevens (voting 
with the majority) became even more brazen in exercising this independent 
judgment and moving away from any need to defer to the states in the next 




222 Id. at 316.  As in Furman, the lack of use made “[t]he practice [of executing mentally 
retarded individuals], therefore, has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a national 
consensus has developed against it.”  Id. 
 
223 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).  As mentioned earlier, the Court’s 
inquiry is “asking whether there is reason to disagree with the judgment reached by the 
citizenry and its legislators.”  Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313. 
224 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.  
225 Id. at 313 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982)). 
226 Id. at 321. 
227 Id. at 317. 
228 Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)). 
229 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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The issue in Roper was whether the Eighth Amendment permitted 
states to execute individuals for crimes they committed before reaching the 
age of eighteen.230  As with Atkins, this case revisited an earlier opinion of 
the Court on the same issue.  In Stanford v. Kentucky, the Court had 
rejected any constitutional limitation on the execution of such individuals 
so long as they were fifteen or older231 at the time of the crime.232
As in Atkins, the Court started with a “review of objective indicia of 
consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that 
have addressed the question.”
 
233  Like in Atkins, a majority of states 
allowed the state practice at issue.234  Even worse than Atkins, however, 
there was less evidence of a trend toward the abolition of executing 
individuals who committed capital crimes before age eighteen.235
After somehow finding consensus among state legislatures, the Court 
in Roper unflinchingly exercised its own independent judgment, explaining 
why it was improper to allow states to execute juvenile offenders: 
 
The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too marked and well 
understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite 
insufficient culpability.  An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold-
blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based 
on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective 
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true depravity should require a sentence less 
severe than death.236
Interestingly, the Court then looked to international opinion to justify 




230 Id. at 555–56. 
  This step beyond the state 
legislatures belies the shift in restraint.  In Atkins and Roper, Justice Stevens 
(and the majority) seem to be looking at the practices of the state 
231 Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).  The Court had set age sixteen (at the 
time of the crime) as a minimum for death penalty eligibility in an earlier case, Thompson v. 
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), in which Justice Stevens authored the majority opinion.  
Following the evolving standards of decency, the Court in Thompson explained that no death 
penalty state that had given express consideration to a minimum age for the death penalty 
had set the age lower than sixteen.  Id. at 826–29.  In bringing its own independent judgment 
to bear, the Thompson Court also emphasized that “[t]he reasons why juveniles are not 
trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their 
irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.”  Id. at 835. 
232 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. 
233 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
234 Id. at 563–66. 
235 Id. at 565–66.  
236 Id. at 572–73. 
237 Id. at 575–78.  The use of international practices as a barometer for evolving 
standards of decency has not been without controversy.  See, e.g., David Fontana, Refined 
Comparatism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L. REV. 539 (2001). 
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legislatures less out of an obligation to exercise some level of restraint, and 
more out of a perceived need to legitimize the exercise of their own 
independent judgment in capital cases.238
In his Roper concurrence, Justice Stevens hinted that the Court ought 
to be willing to reexamine its prior capital punishment precedents: 
  The categorical exclusion of 
certain groups of individuals seems to be less a decision of regulating state 
procedures and more of a step toward abolition altogether. 
Perhaps even more important than our specific holding today is our reaffirmation of 
the basic principle that informs the Court’s interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.  
If the meaning of that Amendment had been frozen when it was originally drafted, it 
would impose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children today.  The 
evolving standards of decency that have driven our construction of this critically 
important part of the Bill of Rights foreclose any such reading of the Amendment.  In 
the best tradition of the common law, the pace of that evolution is a matter for 
continuing debate; but that our understanding of the Constitution does change from 
time to time has been settled since John Marshall breathed life into its text.  If great 
lawyers of his day—Alexander Hamilton, for example—were sitting with us today, I 
would expect them to join Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court.  In all events, I do 
so without hesitation.239
Further, he foreshadowed his opinion as to whether the Court ought to 
abandon restraint to state legislatures altogether and abolish the death 
penalty under the evolving standards of decency doctrine. 
 
3. Repudiating Death 
After over three decades of allowing states to regulate capital 
punishment Justice Stevens finally decided that the states could never 
remedy the problem.  In Baze v. Rees, the Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of Kentucky’s method of execution: its three-drug lethal 
injection protocol.240  While the Court upheld Kentucky’s procedure, 
Justice Stevens wrote separately and concluded that capital punishment was 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment.241
Ironically writing a concurrence, Justice Stevens clearly demonstrated 




238 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321–24 (2002); Roper, 543 U.S. at 563–66. 
  He describes 
their retention of the death penalty as follows: 
239 Roper, 543 U.S. at 587 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
240 553 U.S. 35 (2008).  The result of the Court’s decision to grant certiorari was a hiatus 
of almost a year in executions in the United States.  See, e.g., DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-united-states (last visited Feb. 14, 2011). 
241 Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
242 Id. at 87.  He explained that his decision that the death penalty is unconstitutional 
“does not justify a refusal to respect precedents that remain a part of our law,” but this 
explanation seems, on some level, unconvincing.  Id. 
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The thoughtful opinions written by the Chief Justice and by Justice Ginsburg have 
persuaded me that current decisions by state legislatures, by the Congress of the 
United States, and by this Court to retain the death penalty as a part of our law are the 
product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process that 
weighs the costs and risks of administering that penalty against its identifiable 
benefits, and rest in part on a faulty assumption about the retributive force of the death 
penalty.243
Applying his own independent evolving standards of decency-type 
analysis, Justice Stevens questioned the utility of the death penalty based on 
its inability to achieve the purposes of punishment, particularly 
retribution.
 
244  As a result, Justice Stevens argued that “[f]ull recognition of 
the diminishing force of the principal rationales for retaining the death 
penalty should lead this Court and legislatures to reexamine the 
question . . . ‘[i]s it time to Kill the Death Penalty?’”245
Justice Stevens then explained that the Court’s holdings in Gregg and 
its companion cases afforded a level of judicial restraint toward the states’ 
use of capital punishment because the Court “relied heavily on our belief 
that adequate procedures were in place that would avoid the danger of 
discriminatory application . . . arbitrary application . . . and of 
excessiveness.”
 
246  As described above, Justice Stevens (and the Court) 
tempered this restraint with its application of “the premise that ‘death is 
different’ from every other form of punishment to justify rules minimizing 
the risk of error in capital cases.”247  This process, however, had been 
largely unsuccessful according to Justice Stevens.  Despite these purported 
safeguards, Justice Stevens noted, there were still obvious problems with 
the administration of the death penalty.248
First, Justice Stevens questioned the process by which juries were 
constructed in capital cases, through “death qualifi[cation],” a process that 





243 Id. at 78. 
  Second, Justice Stevens pointed out that “the risk of error in 
capital cases may be greater than in other cases because the facts are often 
so disturbing that the interest in making sure the crime does not go 
unpunished may overcome residual doubt concerning the identity of the 
244 Id. at 80–81. 
245 Id. at 81 (internal citations omitted). 
246 Id. at 84 (internal citations omitted). 
247 Id. at 84; see supra note 197 (describing the Court’s “death is different” 
jurisprudence).  
248 Baze, 553 U.S. at 84.  Justice Stevens also pointed out that “[i]ronically, however, 
more recent cases have endorsed procedures that provide less protections to capital 
defendants than to ordinary offenders.”  Id. 
249 Id. 
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offender.”250  Like Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens also expressed 
concern about the continued “risk of discriminatory application of the death 
penalty.”  Citing the Court’s decision in McCleskey, Justice Stevens argued 
that “the Court has allowed [this risk] to continue to play an unacceptable 
role in capital cases.”251
Ultimately, however, it was the combination of the risk of error 
described above and the consequences of such error that led Justice Stevens 
to cross the second threshold and conclude that capital punishment should 
be abolished, rather than allow the states another opportunity to correct 
these problems.
 
252  He emphasized that “[w]hether or not any innocent 
defendants have actually been executed, abundant evidence accumulated in 
recent years has resulted in the exoneration of an unacceptable number of 
defendants found guilty of capital offenses.”253  Rather than continue to 
defer to the states to remedy these problems, Justice Stevens concluded that 
the better answer was to eliminate the death penalty entirely, as “[t]he risk 
of executing innocent defendants can be entirely eliminated by treating any 
penalty more severe than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole 
as constitutionally excessive.”254
[J]ust as Justice White ultimately based his conclusion in Furman on his extensive 
exposure to countless cases for which death is the authorized penalty, I have relied on 
my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty 
represents “the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal 
contributions to any discernible social or public purposes.  A penalty with such 
  He summed up by quoting Justice 
White’s Furman opinion, suggesting that despite the efforts of the Court 
and the state legislatures, little had changed: 
 
250 Id. at 84–85.  Not helping matters was the Court’s recent jurisprudence in which its 
“former emphasis on the importance of ensuring that decisions in death cases be adequately 
supported by reason rather than emotion has been undercut by more recent decisions placing 
a thumb on the prosecutor’s side of the scales.”  Id. at 85.  Justice Stevens cited Kansas v. 
Marsh, 548 U.S. 163 (2006), where the Court upheld a state statute that requires imposition 
of the death penalty when the jury finds that the aggravating and mitigating factors are in 
equipoise, and Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991), described supra in section III.C.2, 
as examples of the Court’s undercutting of this principle. 
251 Baze, 553 U.S. at 85.  Justice Stevens also cited Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 64 (Md. 
2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 835 (2007), where the Court affirmed “a death sentence despite 
the existence of a study showing that ‘the death penalty is statistically more likely to be 
pursued against a black person who murders a white victim than against a defendant in any 
other racial combination.’” 
252 Baze, 553 U.S. at 86. 
253 Id. (citing Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM L. REV. 55 (2008) and 
D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empircally Justified Factual Wrongful 
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761 (2007)); see infra note 269 (discussing 
the Cameron Todd Willingham case). 
254 Baze, 553 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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negligible returns to the State [is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual 
punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.”255
A few months after Baze, Justice Stevens joined in the majority 
opinion in Kennedy v. Louisiana, a case that prohibited the use of the death 
penalty for child rapists.
 
256  Like Atkins and Roper, the Court in Kennedy 
applied its evolving standards of decency analysis to the use of child rape 
by state legislatures.257  Kennedy, like Coker, did not require the Court to 
use its own subjective judgment or trammel on the practices of a number of 
state legislatures, as almost all states banned execution for child rapists.258  
Nonetheless, the majority was not sympathetic, and demonstrated no desire 
to offer deference to the Louisiana state legislature.259
After his retirement from the Court last summer, Justice Stevens has 
become an increasingly vocal opponent of capital punishment, and recently 
explained in a 60 Minutes interview:  
 
I think we would all be better off if we simply changed course and did away with the 
death penalty . . . .  I think that would be the best rule to follow because that’s 
basically the rule that is followed in most civilized countries as you know . . .  .260
Justice Stevens also reviewed David Garland's book, Peculiar Institution: 
America's Death Penalty in an Age of Abolition, further supporting the 
conclusion that Justice Stevens believes that there is no way to administer 
the death penalty fairly.
 
 261
When I wrote those words [that death is different] I was thinking about individual 
decisions in specific cases.  Professor Garland’s book persuades me that my comment 
is equally applicable to legislative decisions authorizing imposition of death 
sentences.  To be reasonable, legislative imposition of death eligibility must be rooted 
in benefits for at least one of the five classes of persons affected by capital 
offenses.
  Justice Stevens explained: 
262
 
255 Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring)).  
Even after Baze, Justice Stevens has continued to question the procedures by which the death 
penalty is administered in the United States.  In Walker v. Georgia, Justice Stevens dissented 
to the denial of certiorari in a case where the petitioner challenged the administration of 
proportionality review by the Georgia Supreme Court.  129 S. Ct. 253 (2008).  The petitioner 
challenged the same process that the Court approved in Gregg. 
 
256 554 U.S. 407 (2008).  
257 Id. at 422. 
258 Id. at 422–27. 
259 Id. at 423. 
260 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast Nov. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7096956n&tag=contentBody;housing. 
261 John Paul Stevens, On the Death Sentence, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Dec. 23, 2010), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/dec/23/death-sentence/.  
262 Id. 
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Justice Stevens concluded by stating that none of the benefits outweighed 
the costs of keeping the death penalty.263
IV. PANDORA’S BOX AND THE INEVITABILITY OF REPUDIATION 
 
After arriving among mortals, Pandora opened the lid of a great jar that she had with 
her, causing a host of evils and disease to be released among the mortals for the first 
time; for until that moment, men had lived on the earth free from toil and sickness and 
other ills.264
Having established that the three parallel shifts in perspective as to the 
use of capital punishment are questions of institutional and not normative 
choice, this Article concludes by claiming that these outcomes are 
inevitable consequences of the initial decision to constitutionalize capital 
punishment. 
 
In reviewing the capital jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court since Furman through the lens of institutional choice, the result of 
abandoning judicial restraint appears to be one of opening a sort of 
constitutional Pandora’s box.265
These problems began with Furman, where a fractured majority (each 
Justice wrote their own opinion) held capital punishment as instituted by the 
states was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.
  In other words, by constitutionalizing 
capital punishment through its application of the Eighth Amendment, the 
Court exposed itself to a complex, multilayered morass of problems that it 
is ill-equipped to remedy. 
266  In Furman, the Court highlighted many problems with the 
death penalty, most notably the manner in which the death penalty was 




And in recent years, the problems have only magnified, with studies 
264 ROBIN HARD, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY 95 (2004). 
265 In Hesiod’s epic poem World and Days, he describes the story of Pandora.  After 
Prometheus stole fire and returned it to mortals, Zeus ordered Hephaestus to create the first 
woman.  The gods named this woman “Allgifts” (Pandora) because she was the gift of all the 
gods, “a calamity for men,” a “precipitous, unmanageable trap.”  Prometheus had warned his 
brother Epimetheus not to accept gifts from Zeus, but he did not heed this advice and 
accepted Pandora as his bride.  In anticipation of the marriage, Pandora was given an 
amphora, or storage jar, as her trousseau.  When she opened the amphora out flew “grievous 
sicknesses that are deadly to men,” “grim cares,” and “countless troubles,” only hope 
remained in the box.  See HESIOD, THEOGONY AND WORKS AND DAYS 38–40 (M.L. West 
trans., 1988). 
266 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
267 Id. at 256–57 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also id. at 242; id. at 308–10 (Stewart, J., 
concurring); id. at 310–11, 313–14 (White, J., concurring). 
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demonstrating vast amounts of error268 and increasing discoveries of 
innocent individuals on death row as well as the likelihood that innocent 
individuals have, in fact, been executed.269
The “discovery” of such a complex and intractable set of problems is 
certainly not unique to the Eighth Amendment.  For instance, the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition against search and seizure has become a 
complicated mess with no clear rule to determine what constitutes a 
reasonable search or seizure.
 
270  The same is true for the voting 
apportionment cases—once the Court applied the Constitution, the Court 
opened the door to a number of interpretive problems.271  The First 
Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence followed the same 
pattern.272
In all of these examples, experience cautions against the Court’s 
intervention into matters that have been historically addressed by the state 
legislatures.  This concept of judicial restraint and deference toward state 
legislatures makes sense at first blush as a matter of institutional choice.  
State legislatures have a political process that can create nuanced and 
complex sets of rules, conduct thorough research and inquiry, and modify 
such rules as experience demonstrates their flaws and shortcomings.  
Further, state legislatures, as institutions comprised of elected officials, are 
  The application of the Constitution in a single case to an area 
formerly controlled by state government legislation opens the door to a 
series of interpretive problems that are difficult to solve on a case-by-case 
basis.  Thus, despite the Court’s best efforts to limit its involvement in such 
areas, based on an abundance of caution and restraint in applying such 
open-ended constitutional language, the outcome is a long series of cases 
through which it becomes increasingly difficult to establish intelligible 
principles and bright-line rules. 
 
268 See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Patterns of 
Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 209 (2004). 
269 A recent article published in the New Yorker makes a strong case that the state of 
Texas convicted and executed an innocent man.  Cameron Todd Willingham was convicted 
in 1992 for murdering his three daughters.  Their deaths were the result of a 1991 fire that 
broke out in the family’s Corsicana, Texas home.  The conviction was largely based on arson 
evidence that can only be deemed as “junk science,” “myth,” or “folklore” and was later 
disproved by several experts.  Mr. Willingham professed his innocence until his execution.  
His last words were: “The only statement I want to make is that I am an innocent man 
convicted of a crime I did not commit.  I have been persecuted for twelve years for 
something I did not do.  From God’s dust I came and to dust I will return, so the Earth shall 
become my throne.”  See David Grann, Trial by Fire, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42. 
270 See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, Restoring the Fourth Amendment: The Original 
Understanding Revisited, 33 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 47 (2005). 
271 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
272 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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subject to majoritarian opinions and values.  Finally, state legislatures enjoy 
the ability to compare themselves with each other as competing 
experimental laboratories.  Indeed, one of the important values of our 
federalist system of government, as Justice Brandeis famously stated, is that 
“a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”273
On the other hand, the Court does have a responsibility to protect the 
individual rights of citizens against the potential tyrannical overreaching of 
those same state legislatures.  The Constitution, and in particular, the Bill of 
Rights, relies on the Court to intervene to protect those rights.  As Justice 
White has explained, 
 
Judicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict between judicial and 
legislative judgment as to what the Constitution means or requires.  In this respect, 
Eighth Amendment cases come to us in no different posture.  It seems conceded by all 
that the Amendment imposes some obligations on the judiciary to judge the 
constitutionality of punishment and that there are punishments that the Amendment 
would bar whether legislatively approved or not.274
Given the opaque language of the provision applicable here—“cruel 
and unusual” punishment—attempting to protect citizens’ rights under a 
modern understanding
 
275 of such words276 invites the opening of a judicial 
Pandora’s box.277
Thus, this Pandora’s box understanding of judicial restraint begins 
with the premise that certain applications of the Constitution to conduct 
formerly regulated by the state legislatures open a Pandora’s box of judicial 
intervention such that the Court must continually intervene to address the 
myriad of issues that subsequently arise as a by-product of its initial 
intervention. 
 
In this scenario, the Court is left with three choices: (1) try to close the 
box, (2) grapple indefinitely with the vast permutations of its original 
intervention and continue to regulate state legislatures and their legislative 
schemes on a case-by-case basis as issues happen to reach the Court, or (3) 
remove the box altogether (and completely prohibit the states from 
engaging in that area). 
 
273 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
274 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313–14 (1972) (White, J., concurring). 
275 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
276 This is also arguably true under an originalist approach as well.  See Granucci, supra 
note 32; Lain, supra note 73; Stinneford, supra note 32; see also Berry, supra note 70. 
277 As indicated supra at notes 270–71, this is also certainly true for the First and Fourth 
Amendments. 
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Closing the box, although advocated by Justice Scalia in the death 
penalty context,278 is often a near-impossibility.  Once the Court has 
engaged in regulating a particular area under the Constitution, it is difficult 
to go back, particularly given its traditional application of the principle of 
stare decisis.279  This becomes even more true the longer the Court 
continues to apply the constitutional provision, as its general application 
becomes more settled and often more accepted.
Continuing to apply the constitutional provision in a case-by-case 
basis, no matter how tortured the jurisprudence, has been the traditional 
practice of the Court.  It has always seemed willing to give the states 




Death, however, is different.
 
281  While speech, freedom from search 
and seizure, and voting are important constitutional rights, the deprivation 
of one’s life is a far more serious proposition.  As the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly noted, “[t]here is no question that death as a punishment is 
unique in its severity and irrevocability.”282
Death is also different in the sense that capital trials tend to be full of 
error.  According to one recent study, almost seventy percent of capital 
cases involve at least one serious, reversible error.
  Thus, the consequence of 
relying on a case-by-case approach to address constitutional problems is 
that innocent individuals may be executed by the states. 
283
 
278 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 534 U.S. 551 
(2005). 
  Ironically, despite all 
of the Court’s constitutional regulation of the death penalty, the problems 
279 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (explaining the factors to 
consider when applying stare decisis). 
280 See Josh Blackman & Ilya Shapiro, Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed, 8 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 1 (2010) (discussing the Pandora’s box analogy in regards to the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010)). 
281 See e.g., Abramson, supra note 182; Rachel Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: 
The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 1145 (2009).  I have recently argued that life without parole should be its own kind 
of different.  See William W. Berry III, More Different than Life, Less Different than Death, 
71 OHIO ST. L.J. 1109 (2010).  
282 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (death differs from life imprisonment because of its “finality”); 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460 n.7 (1984) (“the death sentence is unique in its 
severity and in its irrevocability . . . .”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 616–17 (2002) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (as “death is not reversible,” DNA evidence that the convictions of 
numerous persons on death row are unreliable is especially alarming). 
283 See Liebman, supra note 268 (providing data concerning the type and frequency of 
error in capital cases). 
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have only increased over time.284  Continued doubts about the capital 
system’s ability to avoid imprisoning innocent individuals285
Thus, the second part of the Pandora’s box understanding of judicial 
restraint, as applied to capital punishment, is that, given the ways in which 
“death is different,” pulling the box off of the table is the inevitable 
conclusion one reaches if one opens the box in the first place. 
 and perhaps in 
some cases, execute them, is perhaps the best evidence that the Furman 
experiment has simply failed. 
Justice Powell ultimately concluded that getting rid of the death 
penalty was the only option after being unable to solve the problem raised 
by McCleskey—that race will always unfairly influence who receives the 
death penalty.286  Throughout his jurisprudence, Justice Powell adhered to 
the principle of judicial restraint, but in the end, concluded that the 
Pandora’s box of capital punishment should be removed from the reach of 
the states.287
Justice Blackmun personally believed that the death penalty should be 
abolished.
 
288  Several times during his tenure on the Supreme Court he 
wrote that if he were a legislator he would cast his vote to strike down 
capital punishment.289  Yet, during the early years of his career, Justice 
Blackmun exercised judicial restraint and refrained from constitutionalizing 
the issue of capital punishment.290  Once Pandora’s box was open, however, 
Justice Blackmun slowly began restricting the application of the death 
penalty in certain circumstances.291  Ultimately, at the end of his career, the 
only remaining option was to remove the proverbial box of death penalty 




  In the end, for Justice Blackmun, all of the tinkering in the 
285 See, e.g., Governor George Ryan, I Must Act, Address at Northwestern University 
School of Law (Jan. 11, 2003), published in AUSTIN SARAT, MERCY ON TRIAL: WHAT IT 
MEANS TO STOP AN EXECUTION 163 (2003).  
286 See supra discussion subpart III.A. 
287 See supra discussion subpart III.A. 
288 I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death 
penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by 
finite minds.  That distaste is buttressed by a belief that capital punishment serves no useful 
purpose that can be demonstrated. 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.238, 405 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
289 See, e.g., id. at 410. 
290 See supra discussion subpart III.B. 
291 See supra discussion subpart III.B. 
292 See supra discussion subpart III.B. 
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world by the Supreme Court could not correct the fundamental problems of 
the administration of the death penalty.293
Justice Stevens likewise sought for many years to solve the problems 
raised by the administration of the death penalty by the various states.
 
294  
He ultimately concluded, though, that despite all of the Court’s 
intervention, the same fundamental errors and flaws still persisted.295  In the 
end, for Justice Stevens, Justice White’s view in Furman—that the costs of 
allowing capital punishment heavily outweighed any benefit it might 
offer.296
To constitutionalize the death penalty, then, sets one on a path toward 
its abolition.  As the Court’s jurisprudence has shown, the Eighth 
Amendment is not, and never will be, an effective tool that can eliminate 
the deep and fundamental problems with the capital systems adopted by the 
states: the propensity for widespread error and the risk (and even 
likelihood) of innocent individuals being executed. 
 
Is the answer then to not constitutionalize it in the first place and allow 
the state legislatures complete autonomy to implement their capital 
systems?  As Justice Scalia has argued, “[t]here is something to be said for 
popular abolition of the death penalty; there is nothing to be said for its 
incremental abolition by this Court.”297
Certainly not.  As the Court explained in Furman, the historical 
implementation of capital punishment has always been full of problems.  
And as remains true today, “[t]
 
hese death sentences are cruel and unusual in 
the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”298
V. CONCLUSION 
  As the 
jurisprudence of Justices Powell, Blackmun, and Stevens can attest, the 
error of the Court came not when it “opened the box” in Furman, but when 
it allowed the box back on the table in Gregg. 
This Article has sought to fill the void of a collective analysis of the 
repudiation of capital punishment by Justices Powell, Blackmun, and 
Stevens from their initial pro-death penalty positions.  It has conceptualized 
these parallel shifts not as normative changes, but from the perspective of 
institutional choice. 
 
293 See supra discussion subpart III.B. 
294 See supra discussion subpart III.C. 
295 See supra discussion subpart III.C. 
296 See supra discussion subpart III.C. 
297 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 353 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
298 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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Thus, this repudiation is a story of abandoning judicial restraint at two 
levels.  First, this Article explored the change at the level of 
constitutionalizing the death penalty in the first place, and then at the level 
of abolishing the death penalty altogether. 
From this jurisprudence, the Article has argued that the conclusions of 
each of the three Justices are the inevitable consequence of abandoning 
judicial restraint because of the Pandora’s box nature of such constitutional 
interpretation.  The Article claims that, in the capital context, there are two 
natural consequences of constitutionalizing capital punishment.  First, the 
initial decision to make the issue a constitutional one rather than one 
exclusively regulated by state legislatures results in the creation of 
numerous doctrinal and jurisprudential problems in the use of the death 
penalty.  As with other similar areas, the problem becomes magnified as the 
Court tries to address these systemic issues one case at a time. 
In the capital context, there is a second consequence of 
constitutionalizing the death penalty.  Based on the notion that “death is 
different” and the high volume of error in capital cases, the inevitable 
outcome of constitutionalizing capital punishment is the conclusion that 
capital punishment should be abolished. 
In sum, then, the Article has attempted to explore and explain the 
dramatic shift in the capital jurisprudence of Justices Powell, Blackmun, 
and Stevens.  Perhaps their sentiments can best be summarized by the 
Frenchman Marquis de Lafayette: 
Till the infallibility of human judgments shall have been proved to me, I shall demand 
the abolition of the penalty of death.299
 
299 C. LUCAS, RECUEIL DES DÉBATS DES ASSEMBLÉES LÉGISLATIVES DE LA FRANCE SUR LA 
QUESTION DE LA PEINE DE MORT, pt. 2, at 42 (1831), quoted in P. MACKEY, VOICES AGAINST 
DEATH: AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1787–1975, at 98 (1976).  His 
contemporary Marquis de Sade similarly remarked that “[the death penalty] is to be got rid 
of . . . because it would be difficult to conceive of a poorer calculation than this, by which a 
man is put to death for having killed another: under the present arrangement the obvious 
result is not one man the less but, of a sudden, two; such arithmetic is in use only amongst 
headsmen and fools.”  MARQUIS DE SADE, PHILOSOPHY IN THE BEDROOM (1795), reprinted in 
JUSTINE, PHILOSOPHY IN THE BEDROOM, AND OTHER WRITINGS 177, 311 (Richard Seaver & 
Austryn Wainhouse trans., 1965). 
 
